After a few days of waiting, Iran's Interior Ministry has officially published the list of eight presidential candidates whose qualifications have been approved by the country’s election supervisory body, the Guardian Council.

The names of the eight candidates include: Saeed Jalili, Gholamali Haddad Adel, Mohsen Rezaei, Hassan Rohani, Mohammad Reza Aref, Seyed Mohammad Gharazi, Mohammad Baqer Ghalibaf, and Ali Akbar Velayati.

For the information of its audience, Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA) has published a short report on the educational and working records of the candidates which follows:

Source: Iranian Students News Agency (ISNA)
http://isna.ir/fa
Translated By: Iran Review.Org

*Iran's 11th Presidential Election (No. 7): Critical Notes on Iran's Forthcoming Presidential Election

*Iran's 11th Presidential Election (No. 6): Statistical Review of Presidential Elections in Iran

*Iran's 11th Presidential Election (No. 5): Economy Top Election Issue

*Iran's 11th Presidential Election (No. 4): Relations with United States

*Iran's 11th Presidential Election (No. 3): Notes on Elections in Iran

*Iran's 11th Presidential Election (No. 2): Political Array of Iran Presidential Election

*Iran's 11th Presidential Election (No. 1): Facts and Figures

Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesman Abbas Araqchi has condemned terrorist attacks across Iraq that have killed over 80 people including a number of Iranian pilgrims.

Araqchi extended condolences to the bereaved families of victims and said such terrorist attacks were in contravention of humane and ethical principles.

He said the terrorist attacks were part of the enemies’ plots to fuel ethnic rifts in the region and undermine the unity among Muslims.

The Iranian official underlined the responsibility of the Iraqi government as well as the security and law enforcement bodies to protect the lives of pilgrims in the Arab country.

At least 86 people have been killed and over 150 others injured in several bomb explosions and shooting incidents the capital Baghdad and the southern city of Basra.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman also said the upcoming meeting of the Friends of Syria, due to be held in Tehran, is aimed at finding a political solution to the ongoing conflict in Syria.

“The meeting is an effort by the Islamic Republic of Iran to help find political solutions to the Syrian crisis,” Araqchi said.

He said that the meeting will be held with the slogan of Political solution - Regional stability on May 29 and a number of countries have been invited to attend the meeting.

The Iranian official reiterated Iran’s opposition to any military intervention in Syria, voicing the Islamic Republic’s support for national dialogue between the Syrian government and the opposition in order to settle the crisis in the Arab country.

Araqchi further condemned the recent wave of deadly terrorist attacks across Iraq, warning that the enemies of the Muslim world are seeking to cause ethnic and sectarian strife between Shia and Sunni Muslims.

Referring to the latest talks between Iran and the IAEA, Araghchi said Tehran does not consider negotiations a failure.

“Talks between Iran and the IAEA has not reached any conclusions so far, but we hope that they would yield results in next rounds, nevertheless we do not consider them a failure,” the Iranian official added.

Commenting on the meeting between Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council Saeed Jalili and the European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton in the Turkish city of Istanbul on May 15, Araghchi said, “Both sides said talks have been fruitful and the date of the next round of negotiations will be determined during future talks.”

“If the P5+1 (Britain, China, France, Russia and United States plus Germany) prefer to continue talks after the [presidential] election that is their choice, because the fundamental stances of our country will not change before or after the election,” Araghchi said.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman has also offered its condolences to the American nation following the death of more than 90 people in a massive tornado that ripped through parts the US state of Oklahoma.

Abbas Araqchi voiced regret over the deadly incident and expressed sympathy with the families of the victims.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman has also condemned a raid by Bahraini forces on the house of prominent Shia cleric Ayatollah Sheikh Issa Ahmed Qassim.

“We strongly condemn this inappropriate move and stress that the element of violence and intimidation and an organized break into people’s houses are not compatible with logic and run counter to all ethical, religious and human standards,” Araqchi said.

Araqchi said acts of insult against senior clerics, attacking people’s houses and employing violence would have no result but the complication of the situation.

The Iranian official said the only solution to Bahrain’s crisis was adopting political methods and paying attention to and realizing popular demands.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman reiterated Iran’s readiness to employ its capacities for helping Bahrain resolve the crisis in a transparent and public manner.

Iran’s Guardian Council says the Constitution and the election law were the criteria for vetting presidential hopefuls.

Guardian Council Spokesman Abbas Ali Kadkhodaei added that the top electoral supervisory body held several sessions to discuss the capabilities, resumes, and even the past actions and remarks of the presidential hopefuls.

He went on to say that “being Iranian, management capabilities, and faithfulness to the principles of the Islamic Republic” are some of the criteria used for vetting hopefuls who want to run in the presidential election.

The Guardian Council approved MP Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel, Supreme National Security Council Secretary Saeed Jalili, Expediency Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei, Hassan Rohani, the director of the Strategic Research Center of the Expediency Council, former First Vice President Mohammad-Reza Aref, Tehran Mayor Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf, former Telecommunications Minister Mohammad Gharazi, and former Foreign Minister Ali-Akbar Velayati.

Former President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, Esfandiyar Rahim-Mashaei, a top aide to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, and former Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki were not approved by the council.

A total of 686 individuals registered from May 7 to 11 for the presidential election, which will be held on June 14.

Pir-Mohammad Mollazehi
Expert on Indian Subcontinent

The recent victory of Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz (PML-N) Party in the country’s National Assembly elections has led to a great deal of debates and speculations about possible future orientation of Pakistan’s domestic and foreign policies. After winning the election, Nawaz Sharif is now in a position to start his third term at the helm of the political power. Nawaz Sharif and his party had already gained power through elections at two junctures, but on each occasion, he failed to continue in office up to the legal end of his five-year term. He was once dismissed from his post, while his second tenure ended prematurely through a military coup d’état. In reality, however, Pakistan is facing very dire conditions and there are different viewpoints as to how the Pakistan Muslim League’s third term in office will end. At any rate, it seems that the strengthening of PML-N’s social base has provided Nawaz Sharif with new opportunities in order to bank on the experiences he has gained during two past incomplete tenures in office, choose a more correct course, and counter the existing crises.

Speaking to reporters in his first press conference in the city of Lahore, Nawaz Sharif pointed to important and sensitive issues facing the country, telling the audience that he and his government were committed to tackling those issues. There are two important points which should be mentioned here in this regard. The first point is the approach which will be taken by the new government to solving economic problems such as inflation and unemployment. Nawaz Sharif has noted that all other problems currently plaguing the country, such as extremism and terrorism, have their roots in Pakistan’s economic crisis and widespread corruption. The second point is about the foreign policy approach of Pakistan which has faced the country with dire problems in its regional and international relations. Nawaz Sharif has vowed to move toward the improvement of relations with India and Afghanistan, which are among problematic neighbors of Pakistan. As for international relations, he has pledged to put the relations with the United States on the right track which would conform to the national interests of Pakistan. It is hard to make a judgment about the extent to which his promises may come true. This is especially the case as senior officials of the PML-N Party have been talking about the necessity to review covert and overt agreements with other countries, which is a clear allusion to cooperation between Pakistan and the United States on the issue of “fighting terrorism.”

The question, now, is whether Nawaz Sharif is actually capable of making basic revisions in the current policies of Pakistan with regard to fighting terrorism? Or, on the contrary, he is just chanting slogans. It is noteworthy that Muslim League Nawaz Party is the closest among all powerful political parties to various religious factions in Pakistan. This issue will provide the party officials with an important opportunity to enter into serious negotiations with radical Islamist currents which have taken up arms and created a serious security crisis for the country. In that case, he would be able to save Pakistan from the crisis which has been created by civil war and destructive sectarianism. However, to be successful in this regard, he has to rectify Pakistan’s foreign policy approaches, especially with regard to relations with the United States. The only benefits that relations with the United States have so far had for Pakistan are repeated missile attacks against various parts of the country as well as airstrikes by Washington’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) against tribal regions in Pakistan which amount to blatant ignorance of Pakistan’s national sovereignty. Will the government of Nawaz Sharif be able to prevent repetition of the United States missile attacks on those regions? If yes, how? These are ambiguities which exist right now and are sure to face any form of revision in Pakistan’s foreign policy with major problems.

At the same time, when it comes to regional relations of Pakistan, the new government of Nawaz Sharif should not only pay attention to India and Afghanistan, but also take into account other neighboring countries, especially the Islamic Republic of Iran and the littoral Arab states of the Persian Gulf. This is especially true as the growth of religious extremism and sectarianism is to some extent dependent on the quality of relations between Pakistan and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf. If Nawaz Sharif manages to adopt a balanced policy, he may become relatively successful in this regard. However, if for any reason, he fails to put Pakistan’s relations with other regional states on the right track, he will certainly face serious obstacles for fulfiling his election promises. In view of such realities, it seems that the PML-N Party will need in its third tenure in power to adopt realistic and balanced policies at domestic, regional and international levels. At domestic level, it should find a way to handle the extremist and sectarian currents, while at regional level he should choose a way for suitable interaction with countries in South Asia and the Middle East. At international level, however, his government should adopt a policy to create a balance between Pakistan’s interactions with the United States, on the one hand, and China, on the other hand.

In South Asia, two neighbors of Pakistan, that is India and Afghanistan, are getting closer. As a result, under the new circumstances, continuation of Pakistan’s past policies will not only fail to meet the country’s national interests, but also jeopardize future outlook for political, economic and social stability in Pakistan. As a result, the country will be exposed to retaliatory measures and tit for tat which will finally face Pakistan with the serious threat of possible disintegration and the collapse of its national power base. On the other hand, Pakistan’s incorrect policies have stirred up sectarian tendencies across the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region and have created tension in Islamabad’s relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia. Although neither Islamabad, nor Tehran or Riyadh have ever owned up to the existence of this tension, it does not change the reality. At international level, forging a balance in Pakistan’s relations with China and the United States is of critical importance. Although this problem has been handed down to Nawaz Sharif by the former government of Pakistan People’s Party, he should now find a solution for it.

At the same time, the situation of the army and relations between party-led governments and the army generals inside Pakistan is still a concern. The PML-N Party, which was ousted from office by a military coup in 1999, needs to engage in constructive interaction with the military during its new tenure. This is especially a concern when taking into account that General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, who is currently heading Pakistan’s Army Staff, is close to retirement and appointment of his substitute seems to be a challenging task for the PML-N Party. In view of the above facts, it would be more realistic to assume that Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz Party and its leader, Nawaz Sharif, will not be treading a smooth road during their third term in power. Therefore, even the slightest error in calculation, both at domestic level, and at regional and international levels, will not only cause the party to fail to alleviate the existing crises, but may also make those crises more serious and lead to another failure for Nawaz Sharif and his party.

Key Words: Pakistan, Correct Policies, Muslim League Nawaz , India, Afghanistan, Extremism and Sectarianism, Mollazehi

More By Pir-Mohammad Mollazehi:

*Washington Angry over Tehran-Islamabad Gas Pipeline Agreement: http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Washington-Angry-over-Tehran-Islamabad-Gas-Pipeline-Agreement.htm

*Ideological Power Struggle: http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Ideological-Power-Struggle.htm

*Massacre of Hazara People: Covert Goals: http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Massacre-of-Hazara-People-Covert-Goals.htm

The west is eagerly awaiting the results of the upcoming June presidential elections in Iran to determine whom they will be working with in Tehran for the foreseeable future. Certainly the nuclear issue will remain a high priority for world powers and Iran. Over a decade of negotiations with Tehran, world powers have challenged Iran’s legitimate rights for enrichment under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), yielding no outcome. The world powers have continued hitting the hammer on the same nail and it is time for a renewed look at the status quo.

Prior to the elections, Iran held two sets of talks in Vienna and Istanbul on May 15 aimed at resolving the nuclear dilemma. Although talks between EU foreign policy head Catherine Ashton and Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili in Istanbul were described as “useful”, no progress was reported. While talks between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Tehran once again failed to achieve any progress. “We had intensive discussions today but did not finalize the structured approach document that has been under negotiation for a year and a half now,” IAEA Deputy Director General Herman Nackaerts said after the eight-hour meeting in Tehran.

Meanwhile there is a glimmer of hope for a breakthrough in the troubled US-Iran relations since the 1979 Revolution. A compilation of factors have increased the chances of success, including the re-election of President Obama; the composition of his new team at the White House, most notably Secretary of State Kerry and Defense Secretary Hagel, not to mention Vice President Biden’s recent remarks about engaging directly with Tehran. The Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei stressed that meaningful talks with the US should be without threats and pressures nor empty rhetoric, but instead backed by genuine constructive actions to demonstrate goodwill. Iranians will go to the ballot box in less than a month to elect the new president. It remains unclear whether the incoming Iranian president will make any advance in Iran-US relations and the nuclear stalemate.

A face-saving resolution regarding the Iranian nuclear dilemma would open the door for broader political dialogue between the United States and Iran aimed at reducing decades of mistrust. If the current approach to nuclear negotiations continues, there is little hope that the nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 (US, Russia, UK, France and China plus Germany) following the Iranian presidential election will be successful. There is a way out of this quagmire by rethinking three key factors that can reorient the current deadlock towards a breakthrough.

The first factor is changing the current dysfunctional composition of the P5+1 or EU3+3 talks with Iran. There are simply too many players to appease and reach a satisfactory outcome. Experience from negotiations in recent years has highlighted the innate bureaucratic red-tape that has marred negotiations and deemed them ineffective from mundane details to the draft of a deal.

The initial nuclear negotiations back in 2003-2005, during which I served as the spokesperson for the Iranian nuclear team, involved dealing with the EU3 (France, UK and Germany) and this failed due to the US absence from the negotiations that rendered a sustainable solution impossible. While joining the talks at the onset of Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Washington opted to launch economic and covert warfare both unilaterally and multilaterally against Iran. This folly has entrenched mistrust, heightened tensions, and compounded the complexity facing the negotiations while at the same time cornered the US administration in terms of its ability to reverse these measures and provide sanction-relief in the hopes of advancing diplomacy.

The best option to alter the current impotent format of the nuclear talks is direct bilateral talks between Washington and Tehran, while keeping the other P5+1 members abreast of the latest progress. The basis for the negotiations should be the ‘Russian Step-by-Step’ proposal introduced in the summer of 2011. The Russian proposal, originally initiated by the US and Russia, addresses both the demands Iran seeks from the international community, and those from the UN Security Council and IAEA. “Iran welcomes Russia’s step-by-step proposal and is ready to make suggestions to cooperate,” says the Iranian presidency’s official website.

The second factor is acknowledging that the dispute between the IAEA and Iran are technical in nature, while the nuclear dossier is political. The Iranians have no issue with applying their obligations under the Safeguard Agreement of the NPT. The dispute lies in the request by the IAEA for intrusive inspections in the framework of Additional Protocol and beyond. Iran cannot grant such concessions without proportionate reciprocation while the IAEA has no authority to strike such a deal. The invitations by Tehran for further negotiations with the IAEA are counterproductive in the absence of political instruments to advance the IAEA’s requests and hence explain the failures of past negotiations with Iran. Such unavoidable failures also hamper broader negotiations with the P5+1.

The third factor is the type of approach to reach a settlement. Since the beginning of nuclear talks in 2003, the world powers insist on a piecemeal approach rather than embracing a comprehensive package to seal the deal. This reluctance will spell doom for any future talks, whether they are held in Washington, Tehran, Almaty, Istanbul, or even on the moon.

A substantial, serious, and comprehensive offer is vital. For success in the nuclear talks, the world powers and Iran need to agree on a package which includes all major demands of both parties, demonstrating the end state. For the world powers, the end state would ensure Iran commits to the maximum level of transparency and cooperation with the IAEA, in addition to granting assurances for non-diversion of its nuclear program toward weaponization in the future. While for the Iranians, the end state would be the recognition of its rights to enrich uranium under the NPT and the lifting of sanctions.

Thanks to these factors, Obama—in his second term in office—and the new Iranian president can break the deadlock on the nuclear impasse and prepare the ground for Washington and Tehran to cooperate on areas of mutual interest and concern. These include stability in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria; energy security in the Persian Gulf; stemming drug trafficking; cooperating in the fight against terrorism and extremism; and reviving economic and cultural ties.

*Ambassador Seyed Hossein Mousavian is a research scholar at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School and a former spokesman for Iran’s nuclear negotiators. He was Iran’s ambassador to Germany from 1990-1997. His latest book is “The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir,” published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

Source: Asharq Al-Awsat
http://www.aawsat.net

More By Ambassador Hossein Mousavian:

*Iran Nuclear Talks: Citizen Diplomacy Would Build Trust: http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Iran-Nuclear-Talks-Citizen-Diplomacy-Would-Build-Trust.htm

*What Kerry Needs to Know about Iran: http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/What-Kerry-Needs-to-Know-about-Iran.htm

*Embrace the Fatwa: http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Embrace-the-Fatwa.htm

Mahmoud Reza Golshanpazhooh
Executive Editor of Iran Review

Iran's Guardian Council has announced that discussions on the qualifications of presidential hopefuls will take longer than the initial 5-day deadline, which the Council had been originally given. As a result, vetting presidential hopefuls for qualifications will end on Tuesday, May 21, and the results will be announced the same day. Certainly, before the full list of candidates who are qualified to run for president in the forthcoming poll has not been made public, any forecast on the results of the election will be impossible. The spokesman of the Guardian Council has already declared that if the names of certain hopefuls did not appear on the final list of candidates, it would not mean that they are not qualified for other posts, because it simply means that they lack enough qualifications to run for president. There is no doubt that the high number of hopefuls who have registered for the presidential poll has made the Guardian Council’s task more difficult. Perhaps, it was for this reason that the spokesman of the Guardian Council announced that putting only a few names on the final list of candidates does not mean that the other hopefuls are not qualified for other positions.

However, regardless of what may happen in Iran's political environment following the announcement of the candidates list on Tuesday, there are two points which I would like to put forth here as an analyst who monitors Iran's political events from the inside while having an eye on the viewpoints of experts on the outside. These are points which I believe should receive due attention in order to make possible an accurate analysis of the current situation in Iran.

First point: The assumption of the confrontation between Iran's Supreme Leader [Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei] and [the former president] Mr. [Akbar] Hashemi Rafsanjani [of course, if the latter person is seen qualified by the Guardian Council and is also elected president]

This is one of the assumptions which have been frequently mentioned in many analytical reports which have been so far published on Iran's presidential election. The proponents of this viewpoint have taken three premises as granted: that there is a covert competition between Mr. Hashemi and Mr. Khamenei; that relations between the two clerics have gone sour in the past few years; and that the Iranian Leader is concerned about Mr. Hashemi gaining power as a result of which the Leader’s powers would become more limited. Based on the aforesaid premises, they claim that Iran's Supreme Leader is not willing to work with Mr. Hashemi because he is afraid of Mr. Hashemi’s power and the possibility that the Leader may lose control of the situation!

Let’s look at this issue from another point of view. Both Mr. Khamenei and Mr. Hashemi are among powerful pillars of the Islamic Republic of Iran's Establishment. Both of them as well as the entire Iranian nation are well aware of this fact. Even despite the correct assumption that there are certain differences in their viewpoints and in the approaches they take to implementing certain policies, none of them has ever made harsh remarks or taken a sharp position against the other. The Iranian political experts have not forgotten the famous announcement by Mr. Khamenei when he said, “Nobody will be equal to Mr. Hashemi for me.” The Leader said this in a public ceremony in which the former President Mohammad Khatami was taking the oath of office and Mr. Hashemi was also present. On the opposite, during the most difficult days of the past few years, especially during the early weeks following the presidential election in 2009, when general conditions proved that there were differences of viewpoints between the two men, there was no sharp criticism exchanged between them which would fall outside the limits of friendly and respectful rules that the two clerics have been observing between them. Undoubtedly, both of them were able under those hectic conditions to add fuel to the turmoil by uttering sharp and provocative remarks against each other. However, this did not fortunately happen and the state of affairs proved that there were certain concerns which were more important to both of them than their superficial or profound differences. Those concerns included protecting the very foundation of the Islamic Establishment and preventing the situation from being misused by people both in and out of the country, who were waiting for any opportunity to increase the gap between these two pillars of Iran's Islamic Revolution.

As one may deduce from news and hearsay, the biggest concern for Mr. Hashemi in the days running up to his announcement of candidacy for presidential election has been agreement, or at least lack of disagreement, of the Leader with his presidential bid. Therefore, Mr. Hashemi’s hesitation would become meaningless if we assumed that every one of these two is bent on showing his power to the other. After Mr. Hashemi frequently announced that his decision to run for president was conditional on the Leader’s consent, it would have been possible for the Leader to communicate his disagreement with Mr. Hashemi’s candidacy directly to him in a private meeting.

Of course, some may resort to more complicated analyses which are based on conspiracy theory. They may even say that the Leader has been opposed to Hashemi’s decision to take part in the election, but Mr. Hashemi has ignored the Leader’s opinion. They may also put forth other pessimistic possibilities: the Leader has shown no opposition because he has been sure that Mr. Hashemi would be disqualified by the Guardian Council; the Leader has shown no opposition because he has been sure that, like the previous election in 2005, Mr. Hashemi would fail to garner enough number of votes. There are also many other pessimistic possibilities. However, the intricacies of politics in Iran sometimes, unfortunately, cause very simple and clear-cut analyses to be buried under tons of hypotheses which result from the personal views and affiliations of the analysts. The main conclusion which can be reached through Mr. Hashemi’s own writings, words, and two election statements, in addition to a lot of written material which has been produced by his advisors and put on their weblogs, is that there is not even the slightest chance that Hashemi means to oppose the Leader, or his presence has come despite his awareness of the Leader’s disagreement. Of course, this does not necessarily mean that the Leader has given the green light to Mr. Hashemi to run for president. The Leader has announced time and again that “I neither tell anybody to come [and take part in the election], nor tell them not to come.”

Conclusion

The assumption that the Leader in Iran is afraid of the presidential bid of a person like Mr. Hashemi is totally made up and fantasized by the media without having anything to do with the realities on the ground. It is quite natural for the Leader to have viewpoints of his own. One president may closely stick to the Leader’s views while another elected president may do it in a different way. In any case, the major policies of the country, especially in such spheres as foreign policy, the nuclear energy program, or relations with the United States, are finally molded and formulated by the Leader in consultation with his aides at the Supreme National Security Council. The Leader also approves and notified the general policies of the Islamic Establishment through the Expediency Council.

Second point: Analysis of Iran's developments on the basis of the mental environment stemming from presidential election in 2009

Another point for discussion is inattention to dynamisms and developments which have taken place both among state-run institutions and among various levels and layers of the Iranian society during the past four years. In another analytical report that I published to round up Iran's political developments in 2012 , I noted that the Iranian people behaved in a more mature and experienced way in 2012 compared to previous years. Perhaps this may seem to be an optimistic viewpoint, but these days, that maturity is quite evident in the analyses that experts produce, viewpoints of presidential hopefuls, positions taken by high-ranking officials, as well as the type of reaction shown by people in addition to their possible level of participation in the upcoming presidential poll. A glance at two statements, which have been so far issued by Mr. Hashemi on his presidential bid, clearly reveal that the present-day Mr. Hashemi is not the same as Hashemi in 2009. Of course, some presidential hopefuls still make controversial remarks, which are mostly aimed to appeal to the media; a higher degree of maturity is also evident in their other viewpoints. Presenting plans and setting a framework for their possible policies in case they win the presidential race are axial and indispensable parts of measures taken by presidential hopefuls. The latest remarks by the spokesman of Iran's Guardian Council prove that impartiality and rule of law is going to have the first say in the upcoming election. Straightforward remarks by presidential hopefuls about their compliance with the law have been more striking compared to all previous elections in Iran. On the other hand, people pay less attention to exaggerated and illogical promises of candidates. Many people who had chosen the boycott of the election as their method of choice for interaction with the Islamic Establishment during past years, have become more aware of the value of the participation in determining their political destiny especially after Messrs. Jalili, Hashemi and Mashaei decided to run for president. There are also many other points which cannot be elaborated here.

Perhaps, something may happen in coming days to cast doubt on some or all the presumptions I have brought and discussed in this article. However, it would be at least useful to know that although the current state of affairs in Iran's domestic political scene is determined by many unknown and possibly unexpected elements, one may also see the color of hope, dynamism, development and maturity, which should not be easily ignored. Attention to the combination of this color with everyday developments, and listening to moderate and fair analyses will make it possible to present a more real schema of Iran's political scene to outside observers.

*Iran's 11th Presidential Election (No. 6): Statistical Review of Presidential Elections in Iran

*Iran's 11th Presidential Election (No. 5): Economy Top Election Issue

*Iran's 11th Presidential Election (No. 4): Relations with United States

*Iran's 11th Presidential Election (No. 3): Notes on Elections in Iran

*Iran's 11th Presidential Election (No. 2): Political Array of Iran Presidential Election

*Iran's 11th Presidential Election (No. 1): Facts and Figures

Iran’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman Abbas Araqchi says the United States’ opposition and lack of commitment to various international disarmament conventions are obstacles to advancing the issue of global disarmament.

Pointing to the US’s 16-year opposition to bringing up the issue of disarmament in the UN Disarmament Conference, Araqchi said, “The US has, for all practical purposes, taken the conference hostage and is hindering its effective performance in advancing international peace and security.”

He said that the US opposition to the protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention, its non-adherence to its commitments under the Chemical Weapons Convention to eliminate its arsenal by 2012, and efforts to prevent global denuclearization as well as a nuclear-free Middle East are all part of Washington’s black record of non-compliance with international obligations and disrespect for international mechanisms on global disarmament and security.

Reacting to Washington’s recent decision to boycott the upcoming UN Conference on Disarmament because of its chairmanship by Iran, Araqchi said, “Iran is among the first founders of the [UN] Disarmament Conference, and as an independent country, it has always played an instrumental and constructive role in advancing the objectives of the conference, in particular that of nuclear disarmament.”

Araqchi further noted, “Iran has also played a key role in negotiations on international treaties, including the Chemical Weapons Convention.”

Describing Iran as a victim of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the Iranian spokesman said the Islamic Republic of Iran along with other peace-loving nations of the world will continue to tap into all national and international potential to contribute to the creation of a WMD-free world.

Iran proposed the idea of a nuke-free Middle East and is among the flag-bearers of nuclear disarmament, he highlighted.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman also said the UN General Assembly’s recent resolution against Syria will only intensify crimes by the extremist groups in the Arab country.

“The resolution has been issued at a time when Syria and the region need peace and stability more than ever,” Araqchi said.

The resolution will not help resolve the crisis in Syria, but will intensify moves and crimes by the extremist groups in the country, which flies in the face of international attempts aimed at working out a peaceful solution to the ongoing unrest, he added.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman has also condemned the recent remarks by Canadian Foreign Minister John Baird and the holding of an anti-Iran conference in Canada as flagrant interference in the Islamic Republic of Iran’s internal affairs.

“The Canadian government’s effort to hold a meeting attended by a number of infamous anti-Iran elements as well as the absurd and irresponsible anti-Iran remarks by the Canadian foreign minister is a clear example of violating the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of countries, which is a basic principle of the international law, and we condemn it,” said Abbas Araqchi.

Araqchi recommended that Canadian officials ascertain the authenticity of their information before resorting to such measures and comments against Iran.

Canada’s blame-game in the foreign policy arena, particularly with respect to the Islamic Republic of Iran, will not be able to divert public attention either inside or outside Canada from issues such as the election fraud known as the Robocalls scandal, which brought the current Canadian government to power, or the blatant and systematic violation of human rights in Canada, Araqchi noted.

He said people around the world have learned about the massive racial discrimination, child trafficking and sex abuse, biased regulations for aborigines and minorities, growing poverty and unemployment among immigrants, racism and xenophobia in Canada, which were all reported by the UN official sources as well as Canada’s non-government organizations.

The international community is concerned about democracy and the human rights situation in Canada, Araqchi emphasized.

Commenting on the recent remarks by US President Barack Obama and UK Premier David Cameron, Araqchi said, “Such remarks about continuing pressure on Iran are discouraging and indicate the lack of a realistic view and the right understanding of reality by those who advocate these pressures.”

Araqchi said the policy of pressure had never been effective, adding that purposeful negotiations made with goodwill were the only way to achieve a solution to the Western standoff over Tehran’s nuclear energy program.

The Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman further welcomed Egypt’s proposal on forming a quartet on Syria and voiced the Islamic Republic’s readiness to help resolve the crisis in the Arab country.

Araqchi expressed satisfaction with the fact that different countries have turned to negotiations as the way to settle the Syrian conflict.

“Currently, the inclination toward resolving Syria’s crisis through political means and nationwide dialogue between the oppositionists, the Syrian government and influential countries is on the rise,” he said.

Commenting on the recent request by the IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano to dispatch a team of experts to Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), Araqchi said Iran will cooperate with the IAEA “within the framework of agreements.”

Iran’s Foreign Ministry Spokesman has strongly condemned Friday’s bloody bombings in neighboring Iraq and extended condolences to the bereaved families of the victims. 

Araqchi said that the terrorist attacks took place at a critical time for both Iraq and the region, adding they were part of plots hatched by terrorists and their supporters to destabilize Iraq and make the country insecure.

“The terrorist acts are carried out with the aim of fueling sectarianism and turning political disagreements into sectarian clashes,” he pointed out.

The Iranian official said that “national solidarity” and “vigilance” of Iraqi people and political groups would undoubtedly foil enemy plots.

He also reiterated Iran’s support of its neighbor, saying, “In line with its fundamental policy of backing the Iraqi nation and government, the Islamic Republic of Iran stresses its support for the Iraqi government’s counterterrorism measures … and announced readiness to contribute to the restoration of Iraq’s security.”

Araqchi also called for unity, national solidarity and cooperation among different Iraqi political groups against terrorists.

Esmail Bashari, Expert on Military Issues, Center for Strategic Research

Syria signed the Agreement on Disengagement with Israel in 1974 according to which a non-military buffer zone was created along its border with Syria. Based on the same agreement, the United Nations deployed its peacekeepers, known as the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), along Syria’s border with Israel and they are still there. In 1982 and following the victory of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, a wave of Islamic tendencies and Islamism was sweeping through Muslim nations. Therefore, the Israeli regime was by no means willing to see an Islamist party like the Muslim Brotherhood to grab power in Syria and take the place of the secular Baath Party.

Relations between Israel and Syria during the past 40 years

After a cease-fire was announced along the lines of contact between Arab and Israeli armies subsequent to the Ramadan War [also known as Yom Kippur War], the United States tried to pave the way for direct negotiations between two belligerent parties and encourage them to sign a peace accord. Washington’s endeavors finally bore fruit on September 17, 1978, after Egypt and Israel signed a peace accord at Camp David. However, signing of a similar treaty between Israel and Jordan did not take place sooner than October 26, 1994. It was then that Jordan recognized Israel and established normal relations with the Tel Aviv regime. The government of Syria, however, did not go beyond signing of cease-fire agreement with Israel on May 30, 1974. Damascus made further measures conditional on the restoration of Syria’s sovereignty over the occupied Golan Heights.

During about 40 years which have passed since the cease-fire agreement was signed between Syria and Israel – that is, both under the former President Hafez Assad, and his son and successor, Bashar Assad – there have been no direct military confrontations between Syria and Israel along their common border. As a result, the Golan Heights – which form the common border between Syria and Israel – have been the scene of the least amount of tension between the two sides. Despite this issue, military confrontation has continued between Israel and Syria in Lebanon either in the form of direct faceoff, or through proxy war.

By attacking Lebanon in March 1978, Israel tried to create a security belt up to a depth of 10 km inside Lebanon along its northern border. However, this measure failed to immunize Israel’s northern regions to military operations which were carried out by Palestinians who were actually based in southern Lebanon. As a result, Israel launched a heavy military invasion against Lebanon on June 6, 1982. During that aggression, Syria’s bases in Beirut, Al Chouf, and Bekka were attacked by Israelis. In a period of two days, Syrians lost about 80 warplanes, a number of SAM (surface-to-air) anti-aircraft missiles as well as tens of their tanks.

Following the end of the clashes in Lebanon, which led to the expulsion of prominent Palestinian figures from that country, the government in Beirut was encouraged by the West to reach an agreement with Israel. Developments in June 1982 marked the end of direct confrontations between Israel and Syria, although the animosity between the two sides never ended.

Israel’s stance on crisis in Syria

Efraim Halevy, the former director of Israel’s spy agency, Mossad, has said in recent remarks about Israel’s position on the ongoing developments in Syria that since the beginning of the unrest in Syria, Israel has considered the fact that Bashar Assad and his father had been able to maintain peace and calm along the Golan border for 40 years following the signing of the cease-fire agreement between the two sides in 1974. Noting that the Golan Heights remained calm even during Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the ex-Mossad chief added that Israel will only interfere in the Syria crisis if the need arises. The Israeli official further claimed that, so far, no sign has been seen to prove that Israel is actually interfering in Syria to stoke the unrest in the Arab country.

Despite his allegations, Israel attacked a convoy of vehicles inside Syria on January 31, 2013. The Israelis claimed that the convoy had been carrying anti-aircraft guns for the Lebanese Hezbollah movement. The convoy was attacked when it had stopped close to a Syrian scientific facility which is better known as Syrian Scientific Studies and Research Center. The center is located in Jamraya district, north of the capital city Damascus. The attack was almost similar to a previous assault by the Israeli air force against a convoy including 17 trucks at Port Sudan. Following that attack, Israel claimed that the convoy had been carrying short-range Iranian missiles, Fajr 3, which were allegedly supposed to be delivered by the government of Sudan to Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. The scientific center in Jamraya was also attacked for a second time by Israel planes on May 5, 2013.

Although such attacks were apparently limited in scope and goals, they clearly reflect the deep concern of Israeli officials about the consequences of the crisis in Syria. Israel fears that continuation of the ongoing clashes in Syria will see radical Islamists sweeping to power and dominating the entire country as a result of which other neighboring states of Israel such as Lebanon and Jordan will become unsafe for the Tel Aviv regime. The sudden fall of Bashar Assad’s government may take the country’s arsenal out of the central government’s control and into the hands of radical elements. For this reason, it is quite possible for Israel; if it feels that the downfall of Bashar Assad’s government is imminent, to attack important military facilities and equipment in Syria in order to totally annihilate them. Israel had carried out similar attacks on Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981 as well as on Syria’s nuclear facilities at Al-Khobar in Deir ez-Zor in 2007. Therefore, if the need arises, Israel can carry out similar attacks against other important military and research facilities in Syria.

Key Words: Israel, Syria Crisis, Golan Heights, Bashar Assad, Military Confrontation, Bashari

More By  Esmail Bashari:

*US and the Persian Gulf Missile Defense Shield: http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/US_and_the_Persian_Gulf_Missile_Defense_Shield.htm

Few People Know Iran War Veterans Who Are Victims of Chemical Weapons Outnumber Hiroshima and Nagasaki Nuclear Attacks Casualties

Tehran’s Peace Museum hosted a special ceremony on Tuesday, May 14, 2013, in which the book entitled, “A Journey Recounted by Coughs,” was unveiled. This piece of writing is, in fact, the narrative report of a journey which took the author, Hamid Hesam, and a group of Iranian war veterans injured by chemical weapons during the eight-year war with Iraq (1980-88), to the Japanese city of Hiroshima in the summer of 1991.

At the beginning of the ceremony, Shahriyar Khateri, an official at the Society for Chemical Weapons Victims Support (SCWVS), addressed the audience. He said, “In this book, Hesam has been able to depict the wrong done to victims of chemical weapons in Iran and victims of nuclear bombs in Japan while removing the distance which previously existed between them. It is true that the chemical warfare launched by Iraq against Iran has been marginalized in books of history by being mentioned only in footnotes, we must try to bring the truth into the main text by writing more of such books.”

“I believe that the kind of connection and closeness that we see between the victims of chemical weapons in Iran and victims of nuclear weapons in Japan is some sort of miracle and I don’t know about any other similar connection anywhere else in the world. In terms of quality, this move is made purely of human emotions, belongs to people, is not for propaganda, and is therefore sure to become lasting,” he added.

The official then pointed to the book noting that the book – which is actually the author’s travelogue – presents a mixture of joy and sorrow and “you can hear the sound of the exhausted breathing of war veterans injured by chemical weapons between its lines.”

“I believe that this book is quite suitable for people who remember war veterans and exactly explains what good they are in our time,” he noted.

Elsewhere in the ceremony, Ali Jalali, a war veteran injured by chemical weapons who had accompanied Hamid Hesam in his last year trip, took to the podium, saying, “During few trips we have made to other countries, we have tried to make the oppressed sound of our chemical-weapon injured war veterans be heard by the rest of the world through addressing meetings in which representatives of more than 120 countries were present. The final result of all these experiences and sufferings will be published in a book which will be an atlas of war veterans wounded by chemical weapons.”

The next speaker was Hamid Hesam, the author of the book. Hesam started his speech by saying that every moment of a war veteran injured by chemical weapons can be made into a book “if there is the will and the ability to do so.” He added, “When I started to accompany my injured friends in this trip, I did not think about writing anything at first. However, two issues always kept my mind occupied. The first issue was an event which is known to the world as nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki [cities in Japan], with the second issue being chemical bombardment of Iranian cities during the Sacred Defense [the eight-year war with Iraq] whose dimensions have not been properly revealed even to our combatants. The similarity between these two issues made me write this book.”

“Some 67 years following the end of the nuclear war in Hiroshima, the world has owned up to its mistake and all textbooks written for schoolchildren across the world, including in Iran, have pointed to this issue. Of course, I believe that in our time the prey and the predator have changed places because the grandchild of Harry Truman, a former US president, was on top of the list of the guests who were invited to the ceremony commemorating victims of Japan's nuclear war. However, few people in the world are aware that the number of Iranian war veterans who were injured by chemical weapons during the Sacred Defense is higher than total people who died in nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This is a great lesson that we have not been able to explain and shed light on all the aspects of this human calamity,” Hesam said.

He concluded, “In this book, I have tried to record the vociferous breaths of these war veterans who are victims of chemical weapons. Today, all people and organizations are duty-bound to make the world hear their voice.”

Source: Mehrnews Agency
http://www.mehrnews.com
Translated By: Iran Review.Org

Link for Further Reading: Blisters and Sanctions

Which Elections Saw Highest/Lowest Turnout?

The Islamic Republic of Iran has had six presidents during the past 35 years. The first two presidents failed to complete their four-year terms in office. The first president (Abolhassan Banisadr) was impeached and removed from his post before fleeing Iran for France. The second president (Mohammad Ali Rajaei) was assassinated in a blast which targeted the prime minister’s office building. Every one of the subsequent presidents, who took charge of the Iranian Executive power, spent two consecutive terms in office.

The first presidential election

- Date of holding: January 25, 1980
- Elected president: Abolhassan Banisadr with 10,753,752 votes
- Second runner: Ahmad Madani
- No. of presidential hopefuls: 124
- Final contestants: 95
- No. of eligible voters: 20,993,643
- No. of voters: 14, 152, 887
- Percent of participation: 67.4

Banisadr’s term in office as presidnet did not last longer than 17 months. During that period, he gradually came to loggerheads with almost all revolutoinary institutions and in addition to showing disregard for the Iranian parliament (Majlis) legislations, he offered his support to such notorious groups as the Mojahedeen-e Khalq Organization. As a result, the late founder of the Islamic Republic, Imam Khomeini, gave an order on June 10, 1981, relieving Banisadr from his post as commander in chief of the armed forces. Eleven days after Imam Khomeini issued his order, that is, on June 21, 1981, the Iranian Majlis passed a bill approving that Banisadr was not qualified to continue in his post as the president. Finally, on June 22, 1981, and following parliamentary approval of the aforesaid bill, Imam Khomeini wrote the answer to a Majlis letter, removing Banisadr from his post as president of the Islamic Republic.

Second presidential election

- Date of holding: July 24, 1981
- Elected president: Mohammad Ali Rajaei with 12,770,050 votes
- Second runner: Abbas Sheibani
- No. of presidential hopefuls: 71
- Final contestants: 4
- No. of eligible voters: 22,687,017
- No. of voters: 14, 573, 803
- Percent of participation: 64.2

On August 30, 1981, Mohammad Ali Rajaei, the president, and Mohammad Javad Bahonar, the prime minister, along with a group of other Cabinet members were assassinated in an explosion set off by a bomb which was planted at the premier’s office.

Third presidential election

- Date of holding: October 2, 1981
- Elected president: Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei with 15,905,987 votes
- Second runner: Akbar Parvaresh
- No. of presidential hopefuls: 46
- Final contestants: 4
- No. of eligible voters: 22,687,017
- No. of voters: 16,847,717
- Percent of participation: 74.2

Fourth presidential election

- Date of holding: August 16, 1985
- Elected president: Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei with 12,205,012 votes
- Second runner: Habibollah Askarowladi
- No. of presidential hopefuls: 50
- Final contestants: 3
- No. of eligible voters: 25,993,802
- No. of voters: 14,238,587
- Percent of participation: 54.7

Fifth presdiential election

- Date of holding: July 28, 1989
- Elected president: Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani with 15,550,528 votes
- Second runner: Abbas Sheibani
- No. of presidential hopefuls: 79
- Final contestants: 2
- No. of eligible voters: 30,139,598
- No. of voters: 16,452,677
- Percent of participation: 54.6

Sixth presidential election

- Date of holding: June 11, 1993
- Elected president: Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani with 10,556,499 votes
- Second runner: Ahmad Tavakkoli
- No. of presidential hopefuls: 128
- Final contestants: 4
- No. of eligible voters: 33,156,055
- No. of voters: 16,769,787
- Percent of participation: 50.5

7th presidential election

- Date of holding: May 23, 1997
- Elected president: Mohammad Khatami with 20,138,784 votes
- Second runner: Ali Akbar Nateq Nouri
- No. of presidential hopefuls: 238
- Final contestants: 4
- No. of eligible voters: 36,466,486
- No. of voters: 29,145,745
- Percent of participation: 79.9

Eighth presiential election

- Date of holding: June 8, 2001
- Elected president: Mohammad Khatami with 21,659,053 votes
- Second runner: Ahmad Tavakkoli
- No. of presidential hopefuls: 814
- Final contestants: 10
- No. of eligible voters: 42,170,230
- No. of voters: 28,081,930
- Percent of participation: 66.6

Ninth presidential election

First round

- Date of holding: June 17, 2005

Hopefuls making their way into the second round

- Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani with 6,190,122 votes
- Mahmoud Ahmadinejad with 5,718,129 votes
- No. of hopefuls: 1,014
- Final contestants: 8
- No. of eligible voters: 46,768,418
- No. of voters: 29,400,857
- Percent of participation: 62.8

2nd round

- Date of holding: June 24, 2005
- Elected president: mahmoud Ahmadinejad with 17,248,782 votes
- No. of voters: 27,958,931
- Percent of participation: 59.8

10th presidential election

- Date of holding: June 12, 2009
- Elected president: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad with 24,527,516 votes
- Second runner: Mir-Hossein Mousavi
- No. of presidential hopefuls: 475
- Final contestants: 4
- No. of eligible voters: 46,199,997
- No. of voters: 39,165,191
- Percent of participation: 85

The highest and the lowest

• The 10th presidential election was held on June 12, 2009. In terms of people’s turnout, it stood first among all the elections held by the Islamic Republic following the victory of the Islamic Revolution with a turnout figure of about 85 percent.

• Out of six presidents who have been elected through 10 presidential elections in the past 34 years, Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei has won the highest number of votes in the third presidential election by getting 95.03 percent of people’s votes.

• The lowest degree of people’s participation in presidential election stood at 50.66 percent which happened on June 11, 1993, while the highest turnout was recorded in the 10th presidential election at 85 percent on June 12, 2009.

• The highest number of presidential hopefuls qualified to run for presidency pertains to the first presidential election with 107 qualified hopefuls and the lowest number of qualified hopefuls was recorded for the fifth presidential election with only 2 qualified hopefuls.

• The highest number of hopefuls registering for presidential race pertained to the ninth presidential poll with 1,014 hopefuls, while the lowest number of registered hopefuls was recorded at 46 for the third presidential election.

Source: MASHREGHNEWS.ir
http://www.mashreghnews.ir
Translated By: Iran Review.Org

*Iran's 11th Presidential Election (No. 5): Economy Top Election Issue

*Iran's 11th Presidential Election (No. 4): Relations with United States

*Iran's 11th Presidential Election (No. 3): Notes on Elections in Iran

*Iran's 11th Presidential Election (No. 2): Political Array of Iran Presidential Election

*Iran's 11th Presidential Election (No. 1): Facts and Figures

Hossein Kebriaeizadeh
Expert on Middle East Issues

New reports on the recent meeting of the member states of Arab Peace Initiative Ministerial Committee in Washington indicate that a modified form of 2002 Arab Peace Initiative has been discussed in the meeting. Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani chaired the committee meeting. According to Sheikh Hamad, who is both the prime minister and foreign minister of Qatar, the most recent version of the initiative is based on the establishment of two states within borders recognized in 1967, and a clause has been added, and agreed to by both parties, for slight exchange of land.

It should be noted that “land for land initiative” is part of the proposed peace process. Therefore, to shed more light on all existing dimensions of this issue, the Arab Peace Initiative should be considered within framework of a plan offered by the United States Secretary of State John Kerry. It was just recently when international media released reports on a plan proposed by Qatar to get the Middle East peace process under way. It is noteworthy that the original Arab Peace Initiative put emphasis on the need for Israel to withdraw behind 1967 borders, recognized the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their homeland, and also made way for the establishment of a Palestinian state with East Al-Quds as its capital. The new initiative offered by Qatar, however, has made changes to some of these points which can be summarized as follows:

1. Crossing out the provision on the need for Israel to withdraw from occupied Arab lands in the Golan heights and Lebanon;

2. Emphasis on the need to achieve a negotiated solution to the problem of refugees without requiring that solution to be “fair” and erasing the note which called for that solution to be “based on the UN General Assembly Resolution 194;” and

3. Removing the clause about East Al-Quds being the capital of the Palestinian state in the third paragraph of the initiative.

Many experts and scholars including Robert M. Danin, a member of the US Council on Foreign Relations, believe that by changing the configuration of the original Arab Peace Initiative, Qatar is actually trying to reconstruct a new peace process which could be attributed to the original Arab Peace Initiative while, on the contrary of that initiative, be rapidly productive and result-based. In this way, Qatar hopes it would be able to encourage Arab states to uphold the new initiative. Danin has argued that pragmatism in Qatar’s foreign policy is a positive component and the Arab – Western front is trying to integrate that component into the Arab – Israeli peace process.

Kerry, who had earlier talked about necessity of making small alterations to the Arab Peace Process, is now of the opinion that such small alterations in Qatar’s initiative will ultimately lead to total metamorphosis of the original Arab Peace Initiative from legal and political viewpoints. Such an initiative cannot necessarily create a consensus among all Arab nations, even between such states as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. In this way, the possibility for the success of the plan will drastically reduce given sharp reactions that Palestinian groups are expected to show to Qatar’s initiative.

On the other hand, since Israel has already embarked on constructing vast settler units on premium and strategic parts of Palestinian lands, Qatar’s land for land initiative possibly envisages the exchange of those strategic plots of land with less strategic parts (such as Negev Desert). Therefore, taking into account that Israel’s settlement policy aims to prevent uniformity and integrity of the Palestinian lands, this policy will be pursued against the Palestinian nation with more force through land for land initiative.

It is undeniable that Qatar has been acting as a smart player in international system. Therefore, the main reason for the presentation of this initiative should be found through a study of Qatar’s behavior and its interaction with the rest of the international community. In view of the internal limitations with which Qatar is facing in terms of hard power potentials, pursuit of a pragmatic foreign policy has been the main option for Doha in its effort to overcome the security concerns it has been facing. However, the most important point with respect to the issue of Palestine is that Qatar’s approach to this issue is similar to its approach to solving the crisis in Sudan’s Darfur region, or Doha’s approach to border disputes between Eritrea and Djibouti. This means that when playing its role in the issue of Palestine, Qatar does not care for the cause of Palestine and is not trying to realize the goals and ideals of the Palestinian nation. Doha considers the issue of Palestine as an opportunity to promote its own regional role and heal the internal damages which it has suffered in competition with other regional powers; it is by no means trying to pursue the cause of Palestine.

Key Words: Arab Peace Initiative, Land for Land, Qatar’s Balfour Declaration, Palestine, Kebriaeizadeh

More By Hossein Kebriaeizadeh:

*Syria Crisis Activating Regional Fault Lines: http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Syria-Crisis-Activating-Regional-Fault-Lines.htm

*Syria Developments, a Model for Iraq Unrest Scenario: http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Syria-Developments-a-Model-for-Iraq-Unrest-Scenario.htm

*Review of Iraq’s Diplomatic Moves: http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Review-of-Iraq-s-Diplomatic-Moves.htm

Shuaib Bahman
Senior Researcher and Member of the Editorial Board of Iran and Eurasia Research Center (IRAS)

Since the ongoing crisis in Syria began, positions taken by the Turkish government on the Syria crisis have raised many questions and, of course, ambiguities among the analysts. The reason is that Ankara’s positions have been in contradiction to the trend which had started in Turkey’s relations with Syria, at least, 10 years before the beginning of Syria crisis. At present, as time goes by, it becomes more and more clear that by taking incorrect positions on Syria, the government of Turkey has made great strategic mistakes and, as a result, has suffered hefty costs both in the area of domestic and foreign policy.

In the meantime, the recent bomb attacks in the southern Turkish town of Reyhanli, with a population of 60,000, have put the government of Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in a difficult situation. The bomb attacks in the small town, which is located close to the common border with Syria, has so far left 46 people dead and injured more than 150 others. Although Turkish officials have been trying to blame Syrian groups supporting the government in Damascus as the main masterminds behind the attacks, the reality is that the main reason behind the current insecurity in Turkey has its roots in the wrong policies and erroneous strategy that the government of Erdogan has adopted on Syria. For this reason, the bomb attacks have faced the Turkish prime minister, who has been trying to keep his country out of the Syria conflict, with a lot of difficulty. At the same time, the United States is not supporting the plan to enforce a no-fly zone over certain parts of Syria, including along its border with Turkey. Ankara has so far failed to attract firm support of the United States and NATO for military intervention in Syria and despite great insistence by officials in Ankara, neither the United States, nor NATO are willing to embark on direct military intervention in Syria, publicly support Syria militants, or send weapons to armed opposition in the Arab country. The bombardment of Turkey’s border areas by the Syrian air force and downing of a number of Turkish warplanes within Syria air space have clearly proven that the United States is not ready to offer military support to Turkey, nor NATO is willing to enter into a new war to defend one of its member states.

Therefore, under current conditions when the United States and NATO are not ready to support Turkey, Ankara is facing complicated problems within its borders. Another concern for the statesmen in Ankara is the possibility of future clashes between Syrian refugees living in refugee camps along the country’s southern border with Syria, and local inhabitants of those regions. For example, following the bomb attacks in Reyhanli, the local people have been attacking the Syrian refugees and all vehicles having a Syrian license plate. Let’s not forget that Turkey is presently playing host to 326,000 Syrian refugees and serious conflicts between them and Turkish citizens can lead to exacerbation of insecurity and instability in more internal parts of Turkey.

In the meantime, the opposition parties in Turkey, as well as all political groups opposing the incumbent government’s policies, have increased their protests to Ankara’s policies toward Syria. Most opposition parties have been insisting that the current problems in Syria have not developed overnight. Therefore, if these problems had existed since a long time ago, why the government of Erdogan maintained cordial relations with the government of the Syrian President Bashar Assad? In fact, the opposition parties argue that the reasoning used by the Turkish officials that the existing government in Syria is not democratic, cannot be accepted. They also emphasize that the foreign policy of Erdogan’s government is under heavy influence of the Western – Arab front which is standing against Syria and is by no means in line with the national interests of Turkey.

In reality, however, the wrong policy that the Turkish officials have adopted in the face of developments in Syria has faced Ankara with many problems and difficulties. On the one hand, the country’s foreign policy has come under serious fire from critics, while on the other hand, such an incorrect policy has increased insecurity along Turkey’s border with Syria and even in more internal parts of the country. Therefore, with the government of Bashar Assad still in place, the government of Turkey has already suffered heavy costs both for supporting Syrian refugees and in terms of measures it has had to take to head off insecurity on its own soil. Undoubtedly, this state of affairs will face Erdogan and his government with more dire problems in future. This is true because the recent victories of the Syrian army in the battle with the armed opposition have not only faced the opposition with difficult conditions, but have also discouraged their regional and international supporters. As a result, the United States has called for an international conference to be held attended by representatives of the Syrian government and the opposition. Neither Washington, nor its regional allies would previously agree to such a meeting under any circumstances. It seems that Turkey has been left alone in the region with a great deal of domestic and foreign problems to deal with.

Key Words: Turkey, Syria, Reyhanli, Bomb Attacks, Military Intervention, Ankara’s Positions, Bahman

More By Shuaib Bahman:

*Iranian – Islamic Civilization: From Fall to Revival: http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Iranian-Islamic-Civilization-From-Fall-to-Revival.htm

*Iran-Russia Relations Overshadowed by S-300 Dispute: http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Iran-Russia-Relations-Overshadowed-by-S-300-Dispute.htm

Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) Saeed Jalili and EU foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton have concluded their talks in Istanbul, Turkey, describing the negotiations as fruitful.

Jalili said he held “fruitful” talks with Ashton, adding the two sides agreed to meet again in the near future.

“We will soon hold talks again to set a date for the meeting,” the SNSC secretary added.

Ashton, representing the six world powers which make up the P5+1 group, also said she had “useful” discussions with Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator in Istanbul on May 15.

“We will now reflect on how to go on to the next stage of the process,” she said in a statement.

“We will be in touch shortly,” she added.

Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council has also condemned the recent deadly bombings in Turkey’s border region with Syria.

Jalili denounced the massacre of innocent people, adding, “Borders between the countries in the region should be the borders of friendship, cooperation and security.”

Jalili further underlined the need for the formation of a security framework within the region, saying that the enemies should not be allowed to conduct any acts against the nations in the region.

“Today, the countries in the region should utilize all their facilities in line with synergy. There are good capabilities in the region” Jalili said, adding that Turkey has good capacities for both the region and the Islamic world.

The senior Iranian official further stated that Syria is also an important force against the Zionist regime of Israel and in supporting the resistance movement.

“We make use of all of our facilities to boost ties between the countries in the region, and if there is any discord, we try to minimize it. The friendlier the relations, the more secure and prosperous the region will become.”

Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have wrapped up their latest round of talks on the Islamic Republic’s nuclear energy program.

Iran’s Ambassador to the IAEA Ali-Asghar Soltanieh who led the Iranian delegation said the two sides presented each other with new proposals.

“We started talking with the IAEA on a modality or structure approach, for the resolution of outstanding issues,” Soltanieh said.

“We were able to further touch upon some remaining issues and we had a progress. Both sides gave proposals in order to bridge the gaps and pave the way for a final agreement and conclusion of a final agreement on the text of this modality,” he added.

The ambassador said the Islamic Republic is determined to prove the peaceful nature of its nuclear program in its negotiations with the world body.

We have decided as a very historical important decision to deal with issue of allegations -- the so-called ‘possible military dimension’ allegation,” he stated, stressing that the move is a volunteer gesture beyond Tehran’s legal obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

The talks were the 10th round of the negotiations between Iran and the IAEA over the Islamic Republic’s nuclear energy program since early 2012. The previous round of the negotiations was held in mid-February in Iran’s capital, Tehran.

Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei has advised the Iranian people to elect a pious, revolutionary, and resolute person as their next president.

“In order to realize their objectives and disappoint the enemy, the people should enthusiastically take part in the election to choose - from among the candidates that the Guardian Council introduces based on legal standards - a competent, virtuous, pious, revolutionary, resolute and steadfast person with jihadi perseverance, who can shoulder the heavy responsibility of [boosting] the country’s dignity and progress in a better manner than the other candidates,” the Leader said.

Commenting on the paramount importance of the June 14 presidential vote, Ayatollah Khamenei said, “Although the election is around one month away, this matter has turned into an important international issue, and global think tanks and the enemies of Iran are even carefully monitoring its preliminary stages.”

The Leader described the upcoming presidential election as another test for the Iranian nation.

In the upcoming election, Ayatollah Khamenei pointed out, the enemies are pursuing objectives contrary to those of the Iranian nation’s, adding that the enemy seeks to create voter apathy and would like to see a person coming to power who “drags Iran into dependence, weakness and backwardness in various fields and puts it on the path of the foreigners’ policies.”

Compiled By: Firouzeh Mirrazavi
Deputy Editor of Iran Review

May 15 is annually celebrated by Iranians as Fedowsi Day. Many art and cultural festivals are held across the country to commemorate the great Iranian epic poet.

Ferdowsi, one of the greatest Iranian poets, was born in 935 CE in a small village named Paj near Tous in Khorasan which is situated in today's Razavi Khorasan province in Iran.

Ferdowsi's magnum opus the Shahnameh, or 'The Book of Kings' is considered one of the masterpieces of Persian literature, and has had considerable influence on subsequent literary works.

The renowned poet is honored for his efforts to restore Iran's cultural traditions after the conquest of Iran in the seventh century.

He devoted over 35 years of his life to the creation of the Shahnameh, which recounts Iran's mythical and historic past.

The romance of Zal and Rudaba, the Seven Labors of Rostam, Rostam and Sohrab, Siavash and Sudaba, the romance of Bizhan and Manizheh and Rostam and Esfandyar are among the most popular Shahnameh stories.

Ferdowsi, A Critical Biography
By:  A. Shapur Shahbazi 

The Shahnameh is an impressive monument of poetry and historiography, being mainly the poetical recast of what Ferdowsi and his predecessors regarded as the account of Iran's history. An account which already existed in a less appealing form in prose works, especially in the Shahnameh of Abu Mansur Abd-al-Razzaq.

Ferdowsi, in these passages, expresses his reflection on life, his religious and ethical beliefs and his admiration of virtue, his praise for his patrons, and his references to the sources he used.

The rest of the work is divided into three successive parts: the mythical, heroic, and historical ages.

The mythical age: After an opening in praise of God and Wisdom, the Shahnameh gives an account of the creation of the world and of man as believed by Sassanians. This introduction is followed by the story of the first man, Gayumarth, who also became the first king after a period of mountain dwelling. He accidentally discovered fire and established the Sadeh Feast in its honor. Stories of Tahmureth, Jamshid, Zahhak, Kaveh, Freidun and his three sons: Salm, Tur, and Iraj, and Manuchehr are explained in this section.

This portion of the Shahnameh is relatively short, amounting to some 2100 verses or four percent of the entire book, and it narrates the events with the simplicity, predictability, and swiftness of a historical work. Naturally, the strength and charm of Ferdowsi’s poetry have done much to make the story of this period attractive and lively.

The heroic age: Almost two-thirds of the Shahnameh is devoted to the age of heroes, extending from Manuchehr’s reign until the conquest of Alexander. The main feature of this period is the major role played by the Sagzi (Saka) or Sistani heroes who appear as the backbone of the Iranian empire. Garshasp is briefly mentioned as is his son Nariman, whose own son Sam acted as the leading paladin of Manuchehr while reigning in Sistan in his own right. His successors were his son Zal and his son Rostam, the bravest of the brave, and then Faramarz.

The feudal society in which they lived is admirably depicted in the Shahnameh with accuracy and lavishness. Indeed, Ferdowsi’s descriptions are so vivid and impressive that the reader feels himself participating in the events or closely viewing them. The tone is significantly epic and moving, while the language is extremely rich and varied.

Among the stories described in this section are the romance of Zal & Rudabe, the Seven Stages (or Labors) of Rostam, Rostam and Sohrab, Siavash and Sudabe, Rostam and Akvan Div, the romance of Bijan and Manije, the wars with Afrasiab, Daqiqi’s account of the story of Goshtasp and Arjasp, and Rostam and Esfandyar.

It is noteworthy to mention that the legend of Rostam and Sohrab is attested only in the Shahnameh and, as usual, begins with a lyrical and detailed prelude. Here Ferdowsi is in the zenith of his poetic power and has become a true master of storytelling. The thousand or so verses of this tragedy comprise one of most moving tales of world literature.

The historical age: A brief mention of the Ashkanian (Arsacids) follows the history of Alexander and precedes that of Ardeshir. After this, the Sassanian history is related with a good deal of accuracy. The fall of the Sassanian and the Arab conquest are narrated romantically, and in a most moving poetic language. Here, the reader could easily see Ferdowsi himself lamenting over this catastrophe, and over what he calls the arrival of “the army of darkness”.

According to Ferdowsi, the final edition of the Shahnameh contained some sixty thousand distiches. But this is a round figure; most of the relatively reliable manuscripts have preserved a little over fifty thousand distiches. Nezami-Aruzi reports that the final edition of the Shahnameh sent to the court of Soltan Mahmud was prepared in seven volumes.

Ferdowsi’s style is that of a superb poet. His epic language is so rich, moving and lavish that it truly enchants the reader. Personal touches in the Shahnameh prevent it from falling into a dry reproduction of historical narratives. No history has been so eagerly read, so profoundly believed, and so ardently treasured in Iran, as has the Shahnameh of Ferdowsi. If a history were ever to influence its readers, the Shahnameh has done and still does so in the finest way. Where many Iranian military and religious leaders failed, Ferdowsi succeeded. With the Shahnameh, the revival and immortality of a nation became possible.

Ferdowsi did not expect his reader to pass over historical events indifferently, but asked him to think carefully, to see the grounds for the rise and fall of individuals and nations; and to learn from the past in order to improve the present, and to better shape the future.

The Shahnameh stresses that since the world is transient, and since everyone is merely a passerby, one is wise to avoid cruelty, lying, avarice, and other evils; instead one should strive for justice, truth, order, and other virtues which bring happiness, ease, and honor.

The singular message that the Shahnameh of Ferdowsi strives to convey is the idea that the history of Iranshahr was a complete and immutable whole: it started with Gayumarth, the first man, and ended with his fiftieth scion and successor, Yazdegerd III, six thousand years of history. The task of Ferdowsi was to prevent this history from losing its connection with future Iranian generations.

Following is an article on Ferdowsi’s masterpiece the Shahnameh, which was written by Charles Melville, a lecturer of the University of Cambridge, in 2007.

The Shahnameh

The Shahnameh or “Book of Kings” is the longest poem ever written by a single author: Abu’l-Qasem Ferdowsi, from Tus in northeastern Iran.

His epic work narrates the history of Iran (Persia) since the first king, Gayomart, who established his rule at the dawn of time, down to the conquest of Persia by the Muslim Arab invasions of the early 7th century CE.

The Shahnameh contains approximately 50,000 verses (bayts, each consisting of two hemistiches, misra‘), and is generally divided into mythical, legendary and historical sections.

The first includes the formation of human society, the domestication of animals, the struggle with the forces of evil and the definition of Iranian territory vis-a-vis her neighbors.

The long central section incorporates the ‘Sistan cycle’ of legends about the hero Rustam and his family, and the endless cycles of wars with the lands of Turan (approximately Turkestan or modern Central Asia), Iran’s traditional foe. These ‘legendary’ sections in fact contain many mythical features and more or less form a continuum with the first.

The historical section, that is, in which some reference to known historical events can be identified, starts only with the appearance of Alexander the Great, also treated as legend. It is remarkable, for example, that there appears to be no reference to the reigns of Cyrus the Great, Darius, or the Achaemenid dynasty that preceded the arrival of Philip of Macedon and Alexander on the scene.

Alexander (Iskandar) is followed by a very brief treatment of the Parthians, and then the Sassanid dynasty (226-651 CE).

The last episode is the murder of the Sassanid ruler Yazdegerd III (632-51), and the punishment of his killer, Mahuy Suri. Its last pages echo with the gloomy predictions of the Persian general Rustam, killed at the battle of Qadisiyah by the Arab commander Sa‘d bin Abi Waqqas.

Ferdowsi was born circa 935 CE and died in around 1020. He was thus writing his life’s work approximately four centuries after the fall of the ancient Persian Empire and the coming of Islam.

The first draft was completed in 999 and the final version in 1010, dedicated to the most powerful ruler of the time, Sultan Mahmud of Ghazna (modern Afghanistan, ruled 999-1020).

His work was conceived as a memorial to Iran’s glorious past at a time when its memory was in danger of disappearing for good under the twin assaults of Arabic and Islamic culture and the political dominion of the Turks.

It has since been used by many subsequent regimes, both imperial and provincial, to assert their proper place in the political traditions of the country, and for dynastic legitimization.

One of the chief ways in which the text could be appropriated, along with the ethical messages it conveys, especially concerning just kingship and the ordering of society, was by commissioning illustrated manuscript copies of the poem. This started at least in the middle of the Mongol period, with the earliest known illustrated texts dating from circa 1300.

The production of illustrated copies continued into the late 19th century, when lithographic printing slowly replaced the creation of manuscripts.

The Shahnameh encapsulates and expresses, as no other work of Persian literature is able to, the Iranians’ view of themselves and their traditional cultural and political values.

 Author: Shuaib Bahman

Hardcover: 387 pages
Publisher: Tisa Press
Language: Persian
Date: Spring 2013
Subject: Culture & Society
ISBN: 978-600-6662-25-1

Book Description

The process of building civilization and reviving ancient civilizations within a new framework, first of all, calls for a civilization-building thought followed by perseverance in implementing plans compiled for this purpose in later stages. This is true as the thought needed for building a civilization is nothing trivial and is higher in ranking compared to general policies which are made and even in comparison with development plans which are meant to promote economic progress in a country. Therefore, making general policies and plans for promoting development, economy and foreign policy of a country are all secondary to plans made for the purpose of building a civilization.

At present, nothing is left of the ancient and outstanding civilizations in Pars, Sumer, Egypt, Elam, Ashur, Anatoli, Phoenicia, Hatti, Urartu, Ugarit, Akritis (Crete), Mycenaea, Maya, Aztec, Celts, Ancient Rome … apart from accounts of their tumultuous histories as well as sporadic objects and ancient relics. However, every one of the aforesaid civilizations indicated the level of progress and civility that their people had reached at that time. Some ancient civilizations including the Islamic, Indian, Chinese, and other civilizations are still living, though not with the same glamour, dynamism, and creativity that they once enjoyed very long ago.

Out of all ancient civilizations, Iran, having a brilliant and very long history with a very sophisticated and amazing civilization, is located at the crossroads of major human civilizations. The country has been able since ancient times up to the present time to offer the most brilliant civilizational products to humanity by preserving its own special culture. The land of Iran has frequently experienced great victories and defeats throughout its tortuous history, but it has always managed to safeguard its cultural and civilizational solidarity and continuity. As a result, even after conversion to Islam, Iranians not only did not forget their national and cultural identity, but also gave birth to the Iranian – Islamic civilization which has, in turn, played a great role in expanding and developing the global human civilization.

At present, the revival of the Iranian – Islamic civilization can be considered the most important goal of the Islamic Republic of Iran which will enable the country to boost its political power and fuel its economic growth while remaining faithful to the ideology of the Islamic Republic and its political and cultural achievements.

In the light of the above facts, the present book entitled “Iranian – Islamic Civilization: From Fall to Revival” has been compiled in five chapters in order to discuss various aspects of all issues related to the Iranian – Islamic civilization. The first chapter puts forth the viewpoints and theories of culture and civilization where the viewpoints and opinions of such thinkers as Ibn Khaldun, Oswald Spengler, Johann Gottfried von Herder, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Arnold Joseph Toynbee, and Samuel Huntington have been discussed in more detail.

The second chapter focuses on the Iranian – Islamic civilization from the standpoint of its scientific, cultural, artistic and other achievements. This is where such world-famous thinkers and scholars as Ferdowsi, Farabi, Avicenna, Abu Al-Rayhan Al-Biruni (known as Al-Biruni in English), Al-Ghazali, Khwaja Nizam al-Mulk Tusi, and Khawaja Nasir Al-Din Tusi are introduced. In the third chapter, the main focus is on the reasons behind the fall of the Iranian – Islamic civilization by exploring three categories of reasons: mental-cultural, economic, and foreign intervention. In the fourth chapter, civilization-building ideas and plans offered by Iranian thinkers, scholars and rulers have been presented in two religious and non-religious categories. In the fifth chapter, emphasis has been laid on national and international approaches to the revival of Islamic – Iranian civilization.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Civilizational Theories and Schools
- Section I: Fundaments and concepts of culture, civilization and philosophy of history
- Section II: Study of theories of culture and civilization

Chapter 2: Iranian – Islamic civilization
- Section I: Nature of Iranian – Islamic civilization
- Section II: Study of Iranian – Islamic civilization

Chapter 3: Reasons behind fall of Iranian – Islamic civilization
- Section I: Mental-cultural factors
- Section II: Economic factors
- Section III: Foreign factors

Chapter 4: Review of civilization-building plans and ideas in Iran
- Section I: Non-religious theories and ideas
- Section II: Religious theories and ideas

Chapter 5: Ways of reviving Iranian – Islamic civilization
- Section I: Internal factors for revival
- Section II: External factors for revival

About the Author

Shuaib Bahman is the Senior Researcher and member of the editorial board, writers' council and Scientific council of Iran and Eurasia Research Center (IRAS)

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*Iran-Russia Relations Overshadowed by S-300 Dispute: http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Iran-Russia-Relations-Overshadowed-by-S-300-Dispute.htm

Iran Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi has warned against the spread of the ongoing Syria crisis to other regional countries, calling on those countries to remain vigilant at the present juncture.

The Iranian Foreign Minister has reaffirmed Tehran’s opposition to any foreign intervention in Syria, calling for a negotiated solution to the crisis in the Arab country.

“We reject any foreign intervention in Syria and we don’t want Syria to plunge into crisis…,” Salehi said.

“The Syria crisis and its consequences for the region are very heavy, and must be peacefully settled within the framework of a Syrian-Syrian solution. If any political vacuum occurs in this country, its consequences would affect all regional countries,” he warned.

Salehi reiterated Iran’s support for Syria’s territorial integrity and the legitimate demands of the Syrian people, noting that the Islamic Republic has undertaken efforts to bring Syrian officials and the opposition to the negotiation table in view of a peaceful solution.

“We have called on the Syrian opposition to negotiate with the government and form a transitional government and determine their own future,” he said.

The Iranian minister, however, made it clear that those terrorist groups which have the blood of innocent Syrians on their hands -- including the al-Qaeda-linked al-Nusra Front -- will not be part of the solution.

The Iranian Foreign Minister has condemned the use of chemical weapons in Syria, expressing Iran’s readiness to attend an international conference on the ongoing crisis in the Arab country.

"We condemn chemical weapons," Salehi said.

Tehran is "categorically against all weapons of mass destruction," he pointed out.

The Iranian minister emphasized that Iran was itself a victim of chemical weapons during the Iraqi imposed war in the 1980s.

Salehi said that Iran is willing to participate in a conference on Syria, which could take place later this month.

Iran can "launch talks between Syria's government and opposition," he said, adding that he was "confident" that progress was being made in ending the unrest.

Iran’s Foreign Minister also said the situation in Syria is ‘very good,’ as the Syrian army now has control over most parts of the Arab country.

“We are hopeful about the future of Syria. Of course, this does not mean that everything will soon be over, [but] the Syrian army has resisted pretty well so far,” said the top Iranian diplomat.

“The region is currently witnessing momentous developments. Therefore, Iran must be in constant contact with the regional countries in order to prevent any incident the inevitable consequences of which could engulf the entire region,” Salehi added.

Iran Foreign Minister also said the meeting of the Friends of Syria will be held in Iranian capital, Tehran, in the near future.

Salehi said that the meeting will be held in Tehran on May 29 and a number of countries have been invited to attend.

“With agree with the outlines of Egypt’s proposal on Syria,” Salehi added.

Iran’s Foreign Minister has warned that any attempt to disintegrate Syria or to cause a potential power vacuum in the Arab country would affect the entire region.

“The Islamic Republic supports Syria’s integrity, unity and sovereignty, and everyone should do the same,” said Salehi.

The Iranian foreign minister said the Syrian government and the opposition should engage in dialog to reach a political solution to the crisis in Syria.

Salehi reiterated that Iran was against foreign interference in the internal affairs of Syria, adding that the Syrian people should determine the destiny of their country.

The Iranian top diplomat further expressed optimism on “the convergence of views between the United States and Russia” on finding a peaceful resolution to the crisis in Syria.

The Iranian Foreign Minister has also reiterated the country’s fundamental policy of promoting cooperation with regional countries, particularly its neighbors.

Continued contacts and consultations between officials in Tehran and Riyadh on various issues of mutual interest can pave the way for bilateral cooperation and help remove obstacles in the way of expanding ties, said the top Iranian diplomat.

Salehi added that cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia, as two influential countries in the region, serves the interests of other regional states as well as the two countries.

He said Tehran - Riyadh cooperation will also contribute to the security and stability of the strategic Persian Gulf region, adding that regional countries can ensure their security through collective cooperation.

The Iranian foreign minister pointed to Iran’s sincere efforts in helping resolve regional crises and highlighted the Islamic Republic’s position on regional developments, especially the situation in Syria, Bahrain and Iraq.

Commenting on the issue of Mali, the Iranian foreign minister said the participants in the OIC meeting exchanged views on the next parliamentary and presidential elections in the African country, as well as the establishment of a new government and the issue of providing Mali with financial aid from the OIC.

Salehi also said Iran was ready to cooperate with the OIC to settle the crisis in Mali.

Strategic Preferences and Political Acting

Seyed Mohammad Kazem Sajjadpour

The crisis in Syria is becoming more and more complicated. Following recent air strikes against a Syrian military research center, the crisis has become even more profound than ever before. As a result, the issue of the United States’ policy, in particular, and the overall position of the [US President Barack] Obama’s administration on the crisis in Syria, in general, has draw a lot of attention from analysts of international issues. The behavior of Russia, China and other regional players as well as the reaction they have shown to the situation in Syria are telltale signs of the reality that this crisis is quite different from other apparently similar crises because Syria has turned into a scene for widespread interventions and activities by both regional and international forces. The main question is how the behavior of Obama administration in this crisis can be possibly analyzed. This question is important because the United States and its allies have become united against the government in Syria. However, the changes and developments in the US foreign policy during the past two years are also noteworthy. On the other hand, domestic dimensions of Obama administration’s policy on Syria are becoming more and more complicated as critics inside the United States, including the Republican leaders at the US Senate, have been accusing Obama of inaction and weakness in Syria. All these factors make the understanding of the US government’s actions and reactions with regard to the crisis in Syria even more important.

To answer that question, it should be noted that the policy adopted by Obama administration on Syria can be better understood when one takes into account that firstly, Obama seeks to strategically weaken all anti-US forces in the region by taking advantage of Syria crisis. Secondly, Washington aims to boost the maneuvering room of its regional allies. And finally, Obama is facing certain opposition at domestic political level. On the one hand, he does not want to be known as a weak president while, on the other hand, he is trying to make the most strategic benefit out of Syria crisis by paying the least political price. These issues will be discussed hereinafter.

Strategic weakening of anti-US forces in region

The first point which is noteworthy about the United States policy on Syria is that the crisis in Syria has turned into the biggest geopolitical dispute among the world powers following the end of the Cold War. No other regional crisis since the end of the Cold War has been equal to Syria crisis in terms of its impact on and consequences for geopolitical developments at regional and international levels. The final result of this crisis is of special import to political and geopolitical arrangements in the region and the world and will be a major turning point. The intervention by international forces, including the United States, in the Syria crisis can by no means be compared to interventions in other cases such as happened in the course of Libya crisis some two years ago. The importance of the impact of Syria crisis on regional and international equations is such that some analysts believe the new Middle East will only take shape after the fate of the Syria crisis is determined and it would be a totally different Middle East compared to what it has been during the past few decades. Therefore, the security behavior of the Americans in the course of Syria crisis should be considered in the light of this fact.

The second point is that since the beginning of Syria crisis up to the present time, Obama administration has been following a single strategic goal which is to weaken the regional axis of Iran, Syria and the Lebanese Hezbollah. Although human rights and other humanitarian issues form the façade of the US endeavors, the deeper layers of Obama administration actually resort to human rights and humanitarian concerns as an excuse to help them to achieve a more important strategic objective which is the weakening of Iran and the regional axis which has Iran at its center. Within this framework, all movements by the United States pursue a clear strategic goal, and there is some continuity in the pursuit of that goal. This goal is actually an umbrella for all the political players which are allies to the United States. As a result, when it comes to weakening of the regional axis which consists of Syria, Iran, and Hezbollah, and to some degree Iraq, all people involved in shaping the foreign and security policies of Obama administration are unanimous about the necessity of weakening that axis.

The third point is that strategic weakening of the aforesaid axis is a very complicated task because the United States is not in control of the entire stage. Early assessments about very rapidly achieving the strategic goal of changing conditions in Syria have been proven null and void. As a result, the proposition which has become increasingly more serious is that even after the possible downfall of [Syria’s incumbent President Bashar] Assad’s government, certain regional forces may gain power which would not be under the full control of the United States and this would create conditions which were previously experienced in Afghanistan after the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. As a result, a strategic discourse has emerged according to which, Syria may become another Somalia in which Al-Qaeda may make the most of the void of a controlling power in the country. As a result, the existence of numerous strategic challenges in the case of Syria crisis in addition to the United States insistence on pursuing its strategic goal in the Arab country have made Washington frequently change positions and show a host of sometimes contradictory reactions during the past two years. However, despite all ups and down, the United States has continued to pursue its strategic goal. The remarkable point, however, is that in pursuit of its strategic goal in Syria, the United States has seemingly opened up the maneuvering room for regional players that are actually implementing Washington’s general strategy and this is a very interesting point.

Making room for regional players

In view of the past strategic experiences, on the one hand, and efforts made by certain regional players to play a role in Syria because their interests in the Arab country overlap with those of the United States, on the other hand, these regional players have been actually playing in the United States court during the past two years. The following basic points, however, should be taken into account in this regard:

1. The first point is the existence of a phenomenon which can be called “Salafi – Israeli” alliance. This is a remarkable phenomenon, which is also very complicated and multilayer. What happened last week in Syria in the form of direct attacks by Israel on a military research center near Damascus, upholds this allegation. It clearly proved that there is some kind of overlap between the interests of forces which are operating under an Islamic façade and are widely known as Salafi forces, and the interests of Tel Aviv. Of course, they may not be totally coordinated in organizational terms. However, according to reports released by some Israeli paper on May 4, 2013, before attacking Syria’s facility near Damascus, Israel had already reached agreements with Syria opposition groups in order to prevent possible operations along Syria’s border with Israel. As a result, there has been some form of operational coordination between Israel and Syria opposition.

2. On the other hand, this Salafi – Israeli alliance is one of the forces which are in work to shape the future Middle East. There is no doubt that some member states of (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council [(P)GCC] are lending support to Salafi forces. Their common strategic aspirations along with their special interpretation of religion have grouped them in a single front while being in tune with Israeli groups in the way they think and act. It seems that the United States is also supporting such an alliance. The next issue with respect to regional players involved in Syria crisis is that the division of labor among various political forces is such that their interests overlap with those of the United States. Turkey is playing the most prominent political role. Qatar and Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, are playing the financial and economic roles. Of course, in addition to its financial role, Qatar has been playing a remarkable media role as well. The Arab League and the (P)GCC, have agreed on their own division of labor in order to manage international and multilateral aspects of this crisis. Interestingly, each and every one of those players has common goals with the United States and many measures which the United States has been planning to take are actually being taken by this alliance of regional players. This, of course, does not mean that all those players are subservient to Washington’s orders and take their orders from the White House. However, in view of changes and developments in international system, these players feel that they should play an independent role and that independent role, is being supported by the United States.

3. The interesting point about these regional players is that they have appeared more radical in the case of Syria than the United States. They put more emphasis on the need to militarize the crisis in Syria and it would be no exaggeration to say that in some instances, they have succeeded in militarizing the United States foreign policy on Syria.  Although the United States has not entered military operations in Syria in a direct and independent way, it would be very naïve to think that Washington is not involved in the military aspect of this crisis. Appropriating USD 250 million as special aid to Syria militant and training of Syria armed opposition in Jordan by American forces prove the United States military involvement in Syria crisis. A telltale example was the report published by the New York Times on May 5 in which the New York Times columnist, David Singer, noted that before Israel carried out its recent military operation against Syria, France, the United States and Britain had agreed on military operations against Damascus. All these cases are indicative of the United States military role in Syria though the extent, quality and form of Washington’s military involvement in Syria crisis has been different from previous crises in other parts of the world.

On the whole, the United States has been supporting and encouraging regional players which, at times, have worked to make Washington’s Syria policy more radical. Obama administration, however, does not see Syria crisis merely from the viewpoint of strategic and regional concerns. The crisis in Syria has already left its mark on the United States domestic policy and its impacts on the United States have been very important in that regard.

US domestic policy and Syria crisis

During the past two years, the US President Obama has been constantly criticized by a number of Republican senators led by John McCain and Lindsey Graham, who accuse him of inaction in the face of the massacre of the Syrian people. These two senators are currently leading a coalition of American politicians who ask for more direct intervention of the United States in Syria crisis. They believe that Washington should provide the Syria opposition with more sophisticated and advanced arms, especially anti-tank and anti-aircraft weapons. In addition, they urge the United States to declare and enforce a no-fly zone over certain regions in Syria, noting that the United States should become more explicitly involved in Syria crisis. The group, however, has been facing opposition from Democrat politicians. Their Democrat opponents both at the US Senate and other state institutions have argued that what the Republicans ask for is the repetition of the same military intervention discourse which was on the United States agenda when it attacked Afghanistan and Iraq under the former President George W. Bush. They say the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq caused the United States to suffer great losses and entered Washington into long-term military conflicts where the basic benefits were reaped by other players. They also believe that the United States should not explicitly repeat the same mistakes again.

Obama administration has set the use of chemical weapons as the red line for military intervention in Syria. Therefore, as speculations about the possible use of chemical weapons in Syria have been rife in past few days, the possibility of military intervention by the United States in the Arab country has also become more serious. In the meantime, the United Nations investigators representing the Geneva-based UN Human Rights Council said in their report on May 4 that there is evidence to prove that Syria opposition has used chemical weapons in its fight against Syria government. Despite that report, the aforesaid allegations about the use of chemical weapons by Syrian government have given more force to the possibility of US military intervention in the Arab country while, on the other hand, being reminiscent of the scenario which was carried out with regard to the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and paved the way for military invasion of that country. There are still ambiguities with regard to whether Obama administration will actually embark on direct military intervention in Syria as well as the quality of that possible intervention. However, Obama administration has been so far able to forge a balance between the pursuit of its strategic goals overseas and the domestic political situation within its borders. Obama has been doing this in order to avoid being labeled as a weak president. However, his opponents have been putting increasing emphasis on the weakness of Obama and his inability to make timely decisions to protect the lives of people. This issue can also work as a determining factor for further militarization of the United States in future. Of course, some analysts believe that Israel will gradually take over the role of carrying out military operations in Syria from the United States, and this change of roles will take place in due time.

On the whole, the above account can make one reach the conclusion that the United States will certainly continue to realize its strategic goals in the region in order to further weaken its regional opponents. In addition, the crisis in Syria has created a kind of convergence among regional players whose interests are in line and common with those of the United States. Finally, there have been debates and domestic discord in the United States over the need to take Washington’s intervention in Syria crisis to a new level by initiating military operations in the Arab country. Nevertheless, taking into account the United States approach to Syria crisis at domestic, regional and international levels, it would be only natural to conclude that the crisis in Syria has not fared the way that Washington expected and will not do so in future either. It is a crisis riddled with challenges which may get Washington involved in later unwanted disputes at regional and international levels.

*Seyed Mohammad Kazem Sajjadpour is the former Ambassador and Deputy Permanent Representative for the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations in Geneva. Prior to taking up this post, he was the Director of the Institute for Political and International Studies, the research branch of Iran’s Foreign Ministry. Seyed Sajjadpour received his Ph.D. in political science from George Washington University and was a post–doctoral fellow at Harvard. He has taught at the College of International Relations of Tehran University, as well as at Azad University and Iran’s National Defense University.

Key Words: Strategic Preferences, Political Acting, Syria, Obama, Anti-US Forces, US Domestic Policy, Sajjadpour

Source: Iranian Diplomacy (IRD)
http://www.irdiplomacy.ir/
Translated By: Iran Review.Org

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*Complicated, but Innovative Diplomacy: http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Complicated-but-Innovative-Diplomacy.htm

*Obama and a Player Called “Iran”: Forecasting the US Foreign Policy up to 2016: http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Obama-and-a-Player-Called-Iran-Forecasting-the-US-Foreign-Policy-up-to-2016.htm

Ali Akbar Asadi
PhD Candidate, University of Allameh Tabatabaei & Expert on Middle East Issues

The process of purging the Baathist elements in Iraq, also known as de-Baathification, was initially kicked off by Paul Bremer, who served as the Administrator of the Coalition Provisional Authority of Iraq following the 2003 invasion of the country. The main goal of the process was to expel the leaders and main elements of Iraq’s Baath Party from the power ranks and start the new process of state building in the country. The process and efforts made in line with it finally gave birth to De-Baathification Law (with the goal of purging the Baathist elements), which was later replaced by the “Accountability and Justice Law.” The law enjoyed the support of various social groups in Iraq, especially Shias and Kurds who had firsthand bitter experiences with the tyrannical and violent policies of the Baath Party and were afraid of the reintegration of Baathist elements into power structure after the country’s dictator, Saddam Hussein, was toppled. In fact, purging the Baathists was a process consisting of major efforts made to create new laws and structures as well as necessary mechanisms in order to prosecute and punish criminal Baathists, strip them of their past privileges and social status, and also prevent their return to power structures and governmental positions. Those efforts were requisite measures which should have been taken in order to guarantee healthy transition of Iraq through its period of political challenges and instability to a new stage of the country’s political life. Nonetheless, from the very beginning, the law came under heavy fire of certain Iraq groups, which included Sunni Muslims and former Baathist elements. The opposition to the law was later transformed into an important factor which encouraged certain Iraqi political currents and the remnants of the former Baathist regime to counter the new state building process in the country.

De-Baathification Law for purging Baathists was finally approved. However, subsequent policies adopted and measures taken under this law became subject to opposition and criticism from various quarters, especially after they turned into a stumbling block by preventing participation of Sunni groups in the new political process in the country. As a result, measures were taken to modify the law by eliminating certain problems and insufficiencies which came to the surface during early years after the downfall of Iraq’s Baathist regime and the dictatorial rule of Saddam Hussein. As a result, some people belonging to the lower ranks of the Baath Party as well as those people who did not have any role in the Baath Party’s criminal and violent measures were gradually allowed to go back to their positions in state-run and security institutions. Therefore, Sunni Muslims found themselves in a better position to take part in the new power structure of the country. However, criticism targeting the “Accountability and Justice Law” and measures taken by the executive board of that law still continue and the country is witnessing negative measures and approaches taken by certain Baathist and Sunni groups under new political conditions. After the beginning of protests by Sunni groups in those parts of Iraq which are dominated by the Sunni population during the past few months, modification and adjustment of that law was put on the agenda of the protesters. However, despite the emphasis put on the need to heed Sunni protesters’ rightful and legitimate demands by the political groups and leaders of Iraq, they hold different views on the extent to which the law for purging Baathists should be amended. Despite those differences, a bill for the modification of De-Baathification Law was finally approved by the Iraqi Cabinet though it should be passed the Iraqi parliament before it officially turns into law.

Approval of a law for the modification of the former law which aimed to purge Baathist elements in the Iraqi government elicited various reactions inside the country. While some Sunni groups like al-Iraqiya and the Iraqi Front for National Dialogue, which is led by Saleh al-Mutlaq, argue that this issue is among legitimate demands of the protesters and should be heeded, most Kurdish groups and Shias in particular are against modification of the law. They believe that the modification of De-Baathification Law will provide the remnants of the Baath Party with an opportunity to return to power and are, therefore, strongly against it. The Shia sources of emulation in Iraq are among the main critics of any modification to the Iraqi government’s new decision. For example, the office of the Grand Ayatollah Sistani issued a statement in which it condemned the approval of changes to the Accountability and Justice Law by the Iraqi Cabinet. The statement strongly took the Iraqi government to task for its measure to bring back “the murderers” of the Iraqi government to the administration and paying salary and pension to special forces loyal to Saddam Hussein, who are known as Fedayeen (those who are ready to die for) Saddam. Meanwhile, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq as well as supporters of the Iraqi cleric, Muqtada Sadr, which form two important Shia currents in Iraq, in addition to the Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki’s State of Law Coalition, have expressed their opposition and concern about the approval of the bill for the modification of De-Baathification Law. Referring to the fact that such political factions as Kurdistan Coalition, Badr, Ahrar, and Fadhilat have already voiced their opposition to the modification, the leader of Sadr Movement [Muqtada Sadr] said, “We cannot be part of a government which has Baathist forces as its members. If the government does not go back over its decision (to modify the law), we would not be part of it.” According to Muqtada Sadr, Iraqi ministers affiliated with his movement will not be part of the government which will also have elements of the dissolved Baath Party, Fedayeen Saddam and other terrorists in it. He noted that such a modification in the law has not been even demanded by protesters in any of the Sunni-dominant provinces of Iraq because they also hate the Baathist elements. The Iraqi Kurdish groups have also voiced their concern about the change of law. For example, Adel Abdullah – an Iraqi MP representing Kurdistan Alliance which is headed by the Iraqi President Jalal Talabani – has requested the sources of emulation in Iraq to put more pressure on the government and make it change its mind about modification of the Accountability and Justice Law.

A review of various reactions shown to the possible approval of the amendment to De-Baathification Law by the Iraqi Cabinet will reveal that this issue has been subject to severe criticism and opposition of most political groups and even religious leaders in Iraq who are seriously concerned about possible reintegration of Baathist elements in the Iraqi government. Of course, a closer look at De-Baathification Law will bring to the light possible insufficiencies in the process of de-Baathification and will help to prevent its untoward consequences for the Iraqi people and the political stability in the country. However, it seems one of the main concerns that approval of the new law has stirred among various Iraqi political groups is the possibility of the law to be exploited by certain politicians who may use it along the line of their own political interests to set the direction of future developments in Iraq. In that case and if gone unnoticed, such a measure could have various negative effects on the security and stability of the Arab country in the long run. As a result, it seems that more dialogue and more detailed analysis of various dimensions of proposed amendment to De-Baathification Law will reduce its negative consequences for the Iraqi society. It will also help all involved parties to try to eliminate setbacks of the law within a national and broad-based framework. In this way, while assuaging the concerns of Sunni groups, it would be possible to dispel the current concerns that Shia and Kurdish groups have about the contents and consequences of the new law.

Key Words: De-Baathification, Law, New Concerns, Iraq, Muqtada Sadr, Iraqi Kurdish Groups, Asadi

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