Iran Review

Nikolas K. Gvosdev

"Iran engagement" is beginning to take on the attributes of kabuki theater, with all of the major participants engaging in pre-determined, stylized dance steps. The latest case in point is the announcement earlier this week by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that Tehran is now open to some form of the scheme proposed by the International Atomic Energy Agency last October, by which Iran would export its low-enriched uranium to France and Russia to be turned into fuel rods for its research reactor. As Howard LaFranchi reported, this "was received favorably by Russia, and it prompted Chinese officials to call for further negotiations with Tehran."

All of a sudden, Defense Secretary Robert Gates' confidence that Iran could soon face "severe sanctions" imposed in part by the United Nations Security Council -- as he testified earlier this week before the House Armed Services Committee -- must be shaken. After all, if negotiations seem to be working, shouldn't we give diplomacy some more time?

More than a month ago, I observed:

In a negotiating style reminiscent of the one employed by the Japanese envoys Kichisaburo Nomura and Saburo Kurusu prior to the outbreak of World War II, Iran is very good at countering U.S. proposals with counterproposals, or taking the offer of compromises only as the basis for further talks. But there is method to this madness. As we have seen, Russian and Chinese commitments to Washington to put further pressure on Iran have been carefully qualified; neither Moscow nor Beijing will impose harsher penalties on Tehran as long as they can claim negotiations for a settlement are ongoing. Even some European countries buy into this logic.

Nevertheless, although the United Nations may not hand President Barack Obama a new set of sanctions, the U.S. Congress is putting the final touches on its own. The version which passed in the Senate last week would prevent companies that help Iran refine its oil into gasoline, build pipelines, or transport its energy cargoes on the high seas from obtaining U.S. loans or other forms of assistance as well as from doing business with the U.S. government.

But even if the bill is left intact by the House when it is time to reconcile the legislation, these measures are unlikely to have much impact. There are plenty of European and Asian firms that aren't reliant on the U.S. as a source of capital or trade.

Moreover, U.S. efforts to sanction non-U.S. firms haven't been particularly successful in the past. In the years immediately following the passage of the comprehensive Iran-Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, European, Canadian, Japanese and Korean firms all made comprehensive investments in Iran's energy sector.

If unilateral U.S. sanctions will not, on their own, bring sufficient pressure to bear on Tehran, what should the Obama administration's next move be?

It doesn't appear that casting Iran as an imminent threat to the entire global community is a workable approach. The United States was able to put together a global coalition in the weeks following 9/11 because other powers -- including Russia, India and China -- did perceive al-Qaida to be a threat to their interests, and even to their territorial integrity, given Osama bin Laden's support for separatists in Chechnya, Kashmir and Xinjiang. But efforts to portray Tehran as a dangerous rogue who equally threatens Moscow and Beijing as well as Washington have not borne much fruit.

Most capitals of the world are in agreement that having yet another nation cross the nuclear weapons threshold is not desirable -- but for many governments, it does not rise to the level of an existential threat. The Bush administration already tried to convince the Russians, for instance, that a nuclear-armed Iran might support Islamic extremists across the Eurasian space. Russian officials countered by arguing that Iran, for the most part, has played a positive role in keeping things quiet in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

So Obama can continue to maintain, as he did in his State of the Union address, that ". . . the international community is more united, and the Islamic Republic of Iran is more isolated." He might even promise that ". . . Iran's leaders . . . will face growing consequences." But it is a promise that others don't feel particularly obligated to enforce.

So what's left? The Obama administration could buckle down and do the hard work of forging a real international coalition on Iran -- the kind of effort that earned President George H.W. Bush the nickname "the mad dialer," in reference to his "telephone diplomacy" with other world leaders to assemble and then hold together the anti-Saddam Hussein coalition in 1990.

It's worth noting, though, that one element in Bush's success was "settling" for a set of objectives that fell short of the maximalist position: expulsion of Iraq from Kuwait as opposed to "regime change" in Baghdad. Is Obama willing to make a similar compromise in terms of the U.S. wish list vis-à-vis Iran, if it would guarantee an iron-clad commitment from other states?

Assuming he is, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton would still have to replicate the deal-making acumen of her predecessor, former Secretary of State James Baker. In his book, "Statecraft," Dennis Ross quotes Baker as saying, "I met personally with all my Security Council counterparts in an intricate process of cajoling, extracting, threatening and occasionally buying votes. Such are the politics of diplomacy."

As Baker's remark makes clear, Bush 41 did not rely solely on appeals to international law to rally support for his policies: Baker made supporting the U.S. position "worth the while" of other governments. That meant including aid packages for Egypt and Turkey (two of the frontline states most directly impacted by the Iraq crisis), having Saudi Arabia extend a $4 billion credit line to the beleaguered government of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, and taking steps to end the isolation of China that had occurred in the aftermath of the events on Tiananmen Square. The Bush 41 team remained firm on what it sought to achieve in Kuwait. But in asking for their support of U.S. plans, Baker made it clear to other capitals that "if there was something we could do to make it easier for them to do so, they should let us know what that might be."

So what would a minimally acceptable demand be for how far Tehran must walk back its nuclear and ballistic missile programs? What would it cost to put together a new international coalition that would be willing and able to put the pressure on Iran to achieve it? And would that price be worth it? This is the logic that should now be guiding our approach to Iran.

Nikolas K. Gvosdev is the former editor of the National Interest, and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media. He is currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College. The views expressed are his own and do not reflect those of the Navy or the U.S. government.

Source: World Politics Review