Evolution of Saudi Strategy: Change for Change
Saturday, February 04, 2012
Hassan Ahmadian, PhD Candidate
Department of Regional Studies, University of Tehran
Gregory Gause, a professor of political science at Vermont University and expert on Saudi Arabia, recently wrote an article entitled, “Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East,” which was published by the Council on Foreign Relations in which he elucidated Saudi Arabia’s approach to regional uprisings. After giving examples, he concludes that creating a counterbalance to Iran's influence in the Middle East will better explain Saudi Arabia’s strategy in the face of the Arab world uprisings. But how can counterbalance to Iran's regional influence be a good explanation for Saudi Arabia’s policy toward popular uprisings in the Middle East? Gause explains his view by bringing Bahrain and Syria cases as examples.
The question is if we accepted Gause’s presumption, then why Riyadh should wait six months before lending its open support to the Syrian opposition? In addition, a pillar of the Saudi balance against Iran in the Persian Gulf is the United States’ military presence in the region. However, at a time that Washington was trying to mediate between Bahraini king and his opponents and supported reforms in that country, Saudi Arabia undermined US efforts by sending troops into Bahrain. How this conflict can be possibility explained? In another instance, what is the relationship between the US support for the unrest in Syria and creating balance against Iran? What is the role of Yemen initiative in this regard?
These questions clearly show that creating balance cannot be the sole way to explain Saudi Arabia’s approach as it suffers from a basic weakness. When explaining Saudi Arabia’s evolving strategy on changes in the Middle East, attention should be paid to the main axes which determine priority of these changes from the viewpoint of Saudi government. The Arabian Peninsula, Arab countries and Muslim countries are three main security priorities of Riyadh in order of importance which can be used to explain the sense of insecurity that Saudi Arabia feels when faced with developments in Bahrain and Yemen and its rapid reaction to developments in those countries. In addition, one of the most basic principles of Saudi Arabia’s domestic and foreign policies is to preserve the status quo and prevent broad-based changes. This principle emanates from conservative and anti-change nature of the Saudi government whose manifestations have been evident in the country’s domestic and regional policies throughout the history of the Saudi monarchy.
It would be difficult, on the basis of counterbalance theory, to establish a rational relationship between the main security axes of the Saudi approach and the necessity of protecting the status quo and preventing broad-based changes in the region, on the one hand, and Riyadh’s support for uprisings in Libya and Syria and offering an initiative for the situation in Yemen to facilitate transition from Saleh’s regime, on the other hand. Saudi Arabia has gone beyond the traditional principle of preserving the status quo in some Arab countries and has supported broad-based changes. This has prompted Gause and many other observers to try to justify this new approach on the basis of creating balance against Iran. However, attention to the nature of “regime change” policy supported by Saudi Arabia will reveal a different reality.
Scrutiny of Saudi policy toward developments in the Arab world will show that pursuit of regime change policy by Riyadh is not at odds with the principle of preserving the status quo inside and outside the country as Saudi Arabia’s policy in this regard is determined by two basic considerations. Firstly, regime change should not happen in the immediate neighborhood of Saudi Arabia to directly affect the country’s interests. Secondly, this policy is pursued in countries with an outlook for long-term and complicated political crisis. These considerations clearly show that Riyadh supports regime change in some countries as a means of preventing regime change in other countries, including member states of the (Persian) Gulf Cooperation Council and other Arab monarchies. As the crisis drags on and increases losses of life and property, and in a world where pictures are transferred instantly, enthusiasm for broad-based changes gradually dampens among the Arab masses. These two considerations can explain one aspect of “balance against Iran” theory which cannot be explained by its advocates which is Saudi Arabia’s cautious approach to Syria while formulating a political initiative for Yemen to help the country in its transition from Saleh rule.
.jpg)
Lack of coordination with Washington with regard to developments in Bahrain stems from the fact that three factors are at work in that country which prevent pursuit of “anti-change change” policy as it would be against Saudi Arabia’s interests: Bahrain’s proximity to Saudi Arabia, Shia-dominated protests in the country, and the fact that its government is a monarchy. Therefore, according to the first consideration of Saudi Arabia’s aforesaid policy, developments in Bahrain should not have led to change. Bahrain, on the other hand, is a security priority for the Saudi government whose security and stability is taken as tantamount in importance to that of Saudi Arabia. Pursuit of that policy in Yemen led to a protracted political crisis in the country which finally marginalized Yemeni people’s desirable option in favor of a solution which was mostly to the benefit of Saudi Arabia and the United States, although protests continue in Yemen and have even increased in proportion as people are protesting to judicial immunity conferred on Saleh (and not his close allies). In Syria, although undermining Iran's regional influence is a major goal, another goal pursued by Saudi Arabia is to cause the crisis to drag on for a long period of time. This is why Riyadh waited six months before starting to support the opposition in that country because before that date, everybody believed that Bashar Assad would be able to calm down the country. As for Libya, Saudi Arabia only started to support people’s uprising after it became clear that the country is engaged in a domestic war with international dimensions which will probably continue for a long time. “Anti-change change” policy is a complicated strategy which has been proven effective, at least, in the short run.
Would such a strategy be viable despite its innate conflicts? Will “pursuing change while opposing it” be able to meet Saudi Arabia’s long-term interests? The success of this strategy will be directly related to Saudi Arabia’s ability to control positive messages arising from developments which have been, at times, supported by Saudi Arabia in line with its “anti-change change” policy, as those messages were conveyed into Saudi Arabia and its neighboring countries. Exerting such a control by replacing positive messages with special messages about the amount of casualties and extent of crisis and instability in crisis-ridden countries will be possible in the short run given Saudi Arabia’s domination over most regional media. However, Saudi Arabia will not be probably able to distort positive aspects of change in the eyes of regional nations for a long time. Therefore, it seems that the distance in time between the current juncture and failure of “anti-change change” policy, will be equal to the distance between crisis-stricken states, topped by Egypt, and stability, security, as well as establishment of democracy.
More By Hassan Ahmadian:
*Yemen’s Transition from Saleh: http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Yemen’s_Transition_from_Saleh.htm
*Iran and Turkey-Egypt Regional Rivalries: http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Iran_and_Turkey_Egypt_Regional_Rivalries.htm
*Majority Government in Lebanon and Forthcoming Challenges: http://www.iranreview.org/content/Documents/Majority_Government_in_Lebanon_and_Forthcoming_Challenges.htm