Iran Review > Iran's Nuclear Program
Almaty Negotiations: Result of Iran - US War of Strategic Calculations
Thursday, March 7, 2013

They expected Iran to change, but in practice, it was the United States which changed. I believe that an important mental shift has occurred in the minds of the US statesmen about the definition of a nuclear Iran. As a result of that change, the definition of the red line which should not be crossed by Iran, and the definition of “Iran's nuclear energy program” in a way that the United States would be able to accept it in a face-saving manner, have also changed.

Iran and P5+1: Outlook of 2nd Meeting in Almaty
Wednesday, March 6, 2013

During negotiations in Almaty, the two sides moved in the direction of strengthening their interactions. This interaction has created an atmosphere which has raised hope in the possibility of using the aforesaid mechanism for achieving final agreements, provided that both sides show respect for each other’s red lines. On the other hand, they should recognize their interests and show interest in solving the issue. Iran's nuclear issue is ten years old and further prolongation of negotiations will be undesirable for both of them.

Suspension for Suspension!
Friday, March 1, 2013

In reality, Iran's nuclear dossier is neither a legal case, nor a technical one. It is, in fact, a politicized case in which the hope for an agreement will be high if the general course of the case and the general direction of the policy adopted by the United States and its European allies toward Iran is changed from confrontation to interaction. The negotiations in Almaty have been just a beginning for such a course and both sides have indicated their readiness to make that change.

Managing Almaty Negotiations without Capitulation or Escalation of Tension
Monday, February 25, 2013

As the public announcement goes, the new round of nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 group of world powers will be held in the Kazakh city of Almaty on February 26, 2013. Before negotiations get underway, it would be helpful to mention a few points which would clearly show how the Iranian side looks upon the negotiations in their totality.

Iran – P5+1: What Happened from Moscow to Almaty?
Saturday, February 23, 2013

The period of time from negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group of world powers over Tehran’s nuclear energy program in Moscow in June 2012, and the forthcoming round of talks which is scheduled to be held in the Kazakh city of Almaty on February 26, 2013, has been characterized by a heap of political developments. A review of those developments will help analysts better understand the situation of Iran and the P5+1 – including the United States, Britain, France, Russia, and China plus Germany – in the forthcoming negotiations in Almaty.

West Must Avoid Giving Useless Concessions to Iran in Kazakhstan
Friday, February 22, 2013

In an interview with Tehran Emrouz newspaper, Mohammad Farhad Koleini, an expert on strategic issues, has noted that if the P5+1 take part in Almaty talks with repetitive proposals, the negotiations should be considered doomed as of now. The detailed text of the interview follows.

West Trying to Kill Two Birds with One Stone in Tehran Talks
Tuesday, February 19, 2013

What the Western countries promise Iran in return for closing down of Fordow is not remarkable. The sanctions which they promise to lift are, in fact, the same sanctions which entered into force on February 4, 2013. What kind of logic is this? They do not respect the principle of proportionality between points which are given and taken by the two sides. Such positions prove that they do not want negotiations to reach a solid result.

Symbolic Importance of the Venue of Negotiations in Diplomatic Efforts
Monday, February 4, 2013

The history of world diplomacy shows that the venue of any kind of negotiations can be actually of significance, especially if one country could be able to convince the opposite party or parties to carry out negotiations on their own soil. This issue is of high symbolic political importance to the host country as it would allow the host to categorically claim that it has not remained passive toward the problem engaging the negotiating parties.

Why Doesn’t Iran Give IAEA Inspectors Permission to Visit Parchin?
Monday, January 28, 2013

Based on the nuclear safeguard – an agreement signed with countries for enforcement of the NPT – the IAEA can only visit regions where nuclear activities are done. It means that the IAEA’s responsibility is to supervise the nuclear activities of countries and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. On the issue of Parchin, it must be said that this site was twice visited by IAEA inspectors in 2005 and the IAEA has officially announced that no nuclear activity was observed in this site. 

Negotiations for Some Seasons
Saturday, January 19, 2013

Herman M.G. Nackaerts, the deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), arrived in Tehran on Wednesday January 16, 2013, for intense negotiations with the Iranian officials in order to reach a plan for the resolution of the Islamic Republic’s nuclear issue. This was the seventh round of talks between the two sides which was held to find an overarching solution to the existing differences between Iran and the IAEA. Before leaving the Vienna Airport for Iran, Nackaerts told reporters that the Agency would aim during Wednesday negotiations to finalize a structural agreement with Iran in order to resume its investigations of Iran's nuclear activities.

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