Iran Review > Iran's Nuclear Program
Nuclear Red Line (No. 1) Stephen Zunes: A Nuclear Iran Deterrence against U.S.-Israeli Aggression
Thursday, June 6, 2013

In order to investigate the different aspects of the U.S. and Israel’s approach to the Iran’s nuclear program in general, and the red lines which the officials in Washington and Tel Aviv have been drawing for Iran, we have begun doing a set of interviews with renowned political scientists and authors from across the world and asked them their viewpoints about the possible scenarios which may take place in the course of the confrontation which the United States and Israel have set out against Iran. Our first interviewee is Prof. Stephen Zunes.

Analysis of Yukiya Amano’s New Report on Iran's Nuclear Activities
Monday, May 27, 2013

The new Iran Safeguards Report released by Director General of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Yukiya Amano is, in fact, repetition of his past periodical reports which have been presented to Board of Governors of the IAEA every three months. This time, however, Mr. Amano has pointed to four major technical achievements in Iran's nuclear energy program which are telltale signs of the Islamic Republic’s progress toward self-sufficiency in the field of enriching uranium for peaceful purposes.

Proof to Illegality of Security Council Measures against Iran
Wednesday, May 8, 2013

When taking decisions on Iran, the Security Council has gone beyond the legal requirements arising from the NPT, the Statute of the IAEA, and even the Safeguards Agreement between the IAEA and Iran. At the same time, the Board of Governors of the IAEA has clearly specified that most of its demands on Iran are for taking voluntary and nonbinding confidence building measures.

Proof to Illegality of Referring Iran's Nuclear Dossier from IAEA to Security Council
Saturday, April 27, 2013

The decision to refer Iran's nuclear case to the United Nations Security Council is bogged by a number of legal problems which have received less attention than they actually deserved. What follows is a brief discussion of those problems.

West Has Indirectly Recognized Iran's Right to Enrich Uranium
Tuesday, April 16, 2013

In the existing conditions, the first confidence building measure to be taken by the West is to recognize Iran's right to enrich uranium after which the Western states can move to announce a schedule for the revocation of all anti-Iran sanctions as well as the best way to do it. In fact, the P5+1 group should specify what steps it wants to take so that Iran would be able to better adapt its reaction to the West’s demands.

From West’s Tactical Solution to Iran's Strategic Perspective in Almaty 2
Thursday, April 11, 2013

While Almaty 2 negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group of world powers ended without reaching a conclusive result, most experts, even the Western ones, still insist that the negotiations have not been a failure. At the same time, both Iran's chief negotiator, Saeed Jalili, and his counterpart in the P5+1, Catherine Ashton, have admitted that there are still wide gaps between the two sides and – as put by Ashton – the two sides are “far apart on the substance” of the negotiations.

Why P5+1 Mechanism Is Not Efficient Enough to Achieve Broad-based Agreement?
Wednesday, April 10, 2013

After several rounds of negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the P5+1 group, it is now clear that Iran “may need other mechanisms different from the P5+1 to overcome the problem because the P5+1 mechanism is not efficient enough to make way for the achievement of a broad-based agreement” between the negotiating parties.

Future Outlook of Iran-P5+1 Nuclear Negotiations
Tuesday, April 9, 2013

What is the future outlook for the nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 group of world powers and will negotiations continue between the two sides? 

New Expectations Arise as Almaty Talks End
Tuesday, April 9, 2013

The P5+1 group is currently looking forward to the results of two major political developments. The first development is the forthcoming presidential polls in Iran with the second one being the future course of bilateral talks between Iran and the United States. Therefore, the final outcome of negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group, either negative or positive, will become clear at most within the next few months.

Tehran 2010 Agreement Overshadows Perspective of Almaty 2 Meeting
Monday, March 18, 2013

A thorough evaluation of the result of the technical talks in Istanbul can provide relative assessment of the ability of Obama administration to overcome structural restrictions which are barring him from entering into a new trend which may lead to the resolution of Iran's nuclear issue. Ultimately, it would be possible to answer this crucial question: Is the United States merely trying to keep the door of diplomacy open to Tehran, or is it actually trying to find a solution for Iran's nuclear standoff.

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