Iran is preparing to go to the polls on June 14 to elect its 11th president since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979.

After several rounds of negotiations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the P5+1 group, it is now clear that Iran “may need other mechanisms different from the P5+1 to overcome the problem because the P5+1 mechanism is not efficient enough to make way for the achievement of a broad-based agreement” between the negotiating parties.

What is the future outlook for the nuclear talks between Iran and the P5+1 group of world powers and will negotiations continue between the two sides? 

The P5+1 group is currently looking forward to the results of two major political developments. The first development is the forthcoming presidential polls in Iran with the second one being the future course of bilateral talks between Iran and the United States. Therefore, the final outcome of negotiations between Iran and the P5+1 group, either negative or positive, will become clear at most within the next few months.

The only problem which actually interferes with relations between the two neighbors is illegitimate transregional decisions which try to disrupt cordial ties between Tehran and Islamabad. Such illegitimate resolve to disrupt relations among countries can be found elsewhere in the world as well.

Two years after the beginning of the popular uprisings in a number of Arab countries in the Middle East and North Africa, which has been known as the Arab Spring, it is now clear that those developments were never harbinger of a spring, or at least, turned into fall sooner than expected.

The crisis in Syria has become very complicated and it seems unlikely that the military confrontation in the Arab country will have any winner. This crisis is rooted in the changing situation in the Middle East and is part of the ongoing changes in the region which may be affected by the final result of this crisis. Consensus among foreign players and redefinition of the role of various political players in this region can be useful and while shortening the duration of the crisis, prevent it from spilling over into adjacent countries.

I believe that Azerbaijan will continue to maintain its strategic position in Iran's foreign policy during the new Iranian year (started March 21, 2013) because the government of Iran wants to see development and progress of Azerbaijan. Although economic exchanges between Iran and Azerbaijan grew by about 30 percent last year, there is still room for further expansion of such exchanges.

A military attack against Iran is currently neither on the agenda of the United States, nor that of Israel and present arguments and discussions are mostly focused on whether such an attack on Iran would be useful in any way. The Israelis are of the opinion that such an attack would be quite useful because it would be the sole way to force Iran not to cross a set limit in its nuclear energy program. The Americans, on the contrary, argue that such an attack would not be useful because their final conclusion is that a war with Iran would not be feasible.

A general review of relations between Iran and Russia during the past Iranian calendar year will show that Iran and Russia have continued their usual cooperation in international affairs. During the same year, the Russians came to understand Iran's regional role in a better way. As a result of this understanding and their determination to curb the United States’ meddling in the Middle East and Eurasia, the Russians have seen a major development in their regional interactions with Iran, which has also brought more warmth and prosperity to bilateral relations between the two countries.