A senior Iranian nuclear negotiator says Iran and the P5+1 group have started drafting the text of mechanisms related to the removal of sanctions imposed on Tehran over its peaceful nuclear program.
Under conditions when a deadlock evidently exists between the Afghan president and the chief executive officer over how to distribute power, it has become somehow easier to pass a judgment in this regard. It is also evident that Ashraf Ghani does not consider the post of the chief executive officer as important as is seen by Abdullah Abdullah and his supporters. Therefore, Ghani does not consider Abdullah as a full partner for the distribution of power on a 50-50 basis.
The crisis in Yemen and its resolution can be a litmus test for the government of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
Franz Michael Millben
In this interview he emphasized that although Iran and EU are suffering from common security concerns in fighting against terrorism, but the present mutual distrust prevents them from any cooperation. Referring to Pakistan’s strategic mistakes in fighting against militancy and insurgency, Michael Millben underlined that as along as Islamabad does not enter in serious cooperation with Kabul and the process of negotiating with Taliban, there would be no success and hopeful future in this regard.
If the US Congress or any other authority prevents the implementation of the agreement by the US government, the same will happen on Iran's side as well, and the implementation of the part related to the Islamic Republic will be also deferred. At any rate, the Islamic Republic of Iran will lose nothing. If a final agreement is reached on the text of the JCPOA, it will be either implemented as it is agreed upon and with due care for Iran's considerations, or it will not be carried out at all. The intervention of the US Congress or any other legal institution cannot lead to any changes in the JCPOA without Iran's consent.
The rationale for the continued malfunctioning Egyptian - Iranian relationship therefore appears to be fundamentally psychological and due to Egypt's relationship with Saudi Arabia which is aimed at trying to roll back Iranian influence in the region. Unless and until there is a new rationale for a reorientation in Egypt's regional relations which could follow progress on regional security measures after the P5+1 deal, a bilateral relationship with Iran will remain elusive.
More pressure on Iran on the account of its nuclear program will only make Iran more adamant and will not be ensued with that kind of compromise that Netanyahu and his allies consider “good deal.” Such state of affairs will only mean escalation of tensions and the rising possibility of war.
Ali Akbar Asadi
The ongoing military intervention in Yemen by Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies has only served to intensify crisis in Yemen, make it more complicated, and usher it into a totally different new phase.
On 31 July 2006, adopting resolution 1696 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security Council demanded that “Iran suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development”. The Council expressed its conviction that “such suspension, as well as full, verified Iranian compliance with the IAEA Board of Governor’s requirements, would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution that guaranteed Iran’s nuclear program was for exclusively peaceful purposes”.
Hossein Mofidi Ahmadi
During recent days, analysts have been mostly focused on a key question about Turkey. Will Ankara choose to take part in the coalition of Sunni Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia, in order to confront Iran in reaction to the current developments in Yemen? And if the answer is yes, will it be a strategic decision on the part of Turkey, or a purely tactical one?